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Abstract 
The growth of usage of Information Technology (IT) in daily operations of en-
terprises causes the value and the vulnerability of information to be at the peak 
of interest. Moreover, distributed computing revolutionized the outsourcing of 
computing functions, thus allowing flexible IT solutions. Since the concept of 
information goes beyond the traditional text documents, reaching manufacturing, 
machine control, and, to a certain extent – reasoning – it is a great responsibility 
to maintain appropriate information security. 
Information Security (IS) risk analysis and maintenance require extensive 
knowledge about the possessed assets as well as the technologies behind them, 
to recognize the threats and vulnerabilities the infrastructure is facing. A way of 
formal description of the infrastructure – the Enterprise Architecture (EA) – of-
fers a multiperspective view of the whole enterprise, linking together business 
processes as well as the infrastructure. Several IS risk analysis solutions based 
on the EA exist. However, lack of methods of IS risk analysis for virtualization 
technologies complicates the procedure, thus leading to reduced availability of 
such analysis. 
The dissertation consists of an introduction, three main chapters and general 
conclusions. The first chapter introduces the problem of information security 
risk analysis and its’ automation. Moreover, state-of-the-art methodologies and 
their implementations for automated information security risk analysis are dis-
cussed. 
The second chapter proposes a novel method for risk analysis of virtualiza-
tion components based on the most recent data, including threat classification 
and specification, control means and metrics of the impact. 
The third chapter presents an experimental evaluation of the proposed 
method, implementing it to the Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) 
and comparing the analysis results to well-calibrated expert knowledge.  
It was concluded that the automation of virtualization solution risk analysis 
provides sufficient data for adjustment and implementation of security controls 
to maintain optimum security level. 
  
 vi 
Reziumė 
Informacinių technologijų (IT) taikymo augimas kasdienėje organizacijų veiklo-
je pasižymi svarbios informacijos talpinimo informacinėse sistemose padidėji-
mu. Dėl šios priežasties, informacijos vertė ir jos pažeidžiamumas yra itin kritiš-
ki organizacijų veiklų tęstinumui užtikrinti. Šiuolaikinės kompiuterizacijos 
paradigmos, pavyzdžiui, išskaidytosios kompiuterinės architektūros, tapo pa-
grindu kuriant lanksčius IT sprendimus paslaugų teikimą perleidžiant trečio-
sioms šalims. Informacijos sąvoka yra itin plati ir apima tekstinę informaciją, 
gamybą, įrenginių valdymą ar net išvadų generavimą. Todėl informacijos apsau-
ga yra labai svarbi organizacijos veiklos dalis. 
Informacijos apsaugos (IS) rizikos analizė ir valdymas reikalauja nuodugnių 
žinių apie turimas informacines vertybes bei technologijas. Tai reikalinga tam, kad 
būtų atpažįstamos grėsmės ir pažeidžiamumai, kylantys turimai infrastruktūrai. 
Formalus infrastruktūros aprašas – verslo architektūra (angl. Enterprise Architec-
ture) leidžia sudaryti daugialypį organizacijos vaizdą, jungiantį verslo procesus bei 
infrastruktūrą. Yra sukurta nemažai IS rizikos analizės technologijų, veikiančių 
verslo architektūros pagrindu, tačiau trūksta šių technologijų taikymo virtualizaci-
jos technologijoms pavyzdžių. Jų nebuvimas reikalauja papildomų veiksmų apra-
šant ir vertinant virtualizacijos saugumą. Taigi, tai komplikuoja šių technologijų 
panaudojimą infrastruktūroje. Šioje disertacijoje nagrinėjami virtualizacijos te-
chnologijų informacinės apsaugos rizikos vertinimo verslo architektūroje ypatu-
mai ir šio vertinimo metodo sudarymas ir pritaikymas. 
Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, trys pagrindiniai skyriai ir bendrosios išvados. 
Pirmajame skyriuje apibrėžiama informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės automa-
tizavimo problema. Šiame skyriuje taip pat apžvelgiami informacijos apsaugos 
rizikos analizės pažangiausi metodai ir jų taikymas. 
Antrajame skyriuje siūlomas naujas informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės 
metodas virtualizacijos technologijoms. Siūlomas metodas apima virtualizacijos 
grėsmių klasifikavimą ir specifikavimą, kontrolės priemonių parinkimą bei kie-
kybinį rizikos analizės vertinimo metodą. 
Trečiajame skyriuje pristatomas eksperimentinis pasiūlyto metodo vertini-
mas įgyvendinant jį kibernetinės apsaugos modeliavimo kalbos (CySeMoL) ap-
linkoje ir palyginant vertinimo rezultatus su kalibruotomis ekspertinėmis šios 
srities žiniomis. 
Eksperimentinio tyrimo metu nustatyta, kad siūlomas virtualizacijos te-
chnologijų rizikos analizės automatizavimo metodas suteikia pakankamai duo-
menų apie IS lygį, kad būtų galima modeliuoti virtualizacijos komponentų sau-
gumo priemonių taikymą.   
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Notations 
Symbols 
AC – Access vulnerability variable (page 40); 
Ie – The information score (page 47); 
C(e) – The calibration score (page 47); 
CF – Configuration vulnerability variable (page 40); 
He – The average response entropy score (page 47); 
s – Standard deviation (page 44); 
SV – Software Vulnerability (page 40); 
TI – Traffic Isolation vulnerability variable (page 40); 
VF – Virtual Firewall vulnerability variable (page 40). 
Abbreviations 
ADtree – An Attack-Defense tree concept (Kordy et al. 2012); 
CCM – The Cloud Control Matrix issued by the Cloud Security Alliance (Cloud 
Security Alliance 2014); 
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team; 
CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures code identifier managed by NIST; 
CVSS – Common Vulnerability Scoring System; 
CySeMoL – the Cyber Security Modeling Language; 
 viii 
DHS – The United States Department of Homeland Security; 
DoS – Denial of Service attack; 
EA – Enterprise Architecture; 
EDB – Exploit Database; 
FIRST – Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams; 
IS – Information Security; 
ISRA – Information security risk analysis; 
IT – Information Technology; 
NCCIC – National Cybersecurity & Communications Integration Center; 
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology; 
NVD – National Vulnerability database managed by NIST; 
OS – Operating System; 
SANS – System administration, Audit, Networking and Security Institute; 
VM – Virtual Machine. 
Domain Specific Definitions 
Asset – A major application, general support system, high impact program, physical 
plant, mission critical system, personnel, equipment, or a logically related group of sys-
tems (Kissel 2013); 
Attack – attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorized access to or 
make unauthorized use of an asset (ISO 27000: 2014); 
Attack Scenario – algorithm or calculation combining one or more measures with asso-
ciated decision criteria (ISO 27000: 2014); 
Control – measure that is modifying risk. Controls include any process, policy, device, 
practice, or other actions which modify risk (ISO 27000: 2014); 
Cybersecurity – The ability to protect or defend the use of cyberspace from cyber attacks 
(Kissel 2013); 
Data – A subset of information in an electronic format that allows it to be retrieved or 
transmitted (Kissel 2013); 
Domain – A set of subjects, their information objects, and a common security policy 
(Kissel 2013); 
Enterprise Architecture (EA) – The description of an enterprise’s entire set of infor-
mation systems: how they are configured, how they are integrated, how they interface to 
the external environment at the enterprise’s boundary, how they are operated to support 
the enterprise mission, and how they contribute to the enterprise’s overall security pos-
ture (Kissel 2013); 
Expertise – expert opinion claiming the most expertise for a given item (Cooke 1991); 
Exploitability – metrics that reflect the characteristics of the thing that is vulnerable, 
which we refer to formally as the vulnerable component (FIRST 2014); 
Information Security – The protection of information and information systems from un-
authorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to 
provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability (Kissel 2013); 
Information Security Risk – The risk to organizational operations (including mission, 
functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and 
 ix 
the Nation due to the potential for unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modi-
fication, or destruction of information and/or information systems (Kissel 2013); 
Risk – effect of uncertainty on objectives. An effect is a deviation from the expected – 
positive or negative. Uncertainty is the state, even partial, of deficiency of information 
related to, understanding or knowledge of, an event, its consequence, or likelihood. Risk 
is characterized by reference to potential events and consequences, or a combination of 
these and is expressed in terms of a combination of the consequences of an event and the 
associated likelihood of occurrence (ISO 27000: 2014);  
Risk Analysis – process to comprehend the nature of risk and to determine the level of 
risk. It provides the basis for risk evaluation and decisions about risk treatment 
(ISO 27000: 2014); 
Risk Management – coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with re-
gard to risk (ISO 27000: 2014); 
Security Requirement – need or expectation that is stated, generally implied or obligatory 
(ISO 27000: 2014); 
Taxonomy – a controlled vocabulary consisting of preferred items, all of which are con-
nected in a hierarchy or polyhierarchy (ANSI 2010); 
Threat – potential cause of an unwanted incident, which may result in harm to a system 
or organization (ISO 27000: 2014); 
Vulnerability – weakness of an asset or control that can be exploited by one or more 
threats (ISO 27000: 2014). 
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Introduction 
Problem Formulation 
Information Security (IS) is one of the major concerns of the modern organiza-
tion. As the usage of Information Technology (IT) is constantly growing, evolv-
ing and reaching most of the activities within and outside the organization, the 
IS plays the key role in ensuring the fluent process execution. Due to the ex-
panding interest for the IS in the last decades, there have been numerous studies 
worldwide on how to control the IS up to a chosen level. This has resulted in a 
good understanding in what is required given the situation. To simplify the pro-
cess of ensuring the IS, specific automation tools have been developed, imple-
menting the results of the scientific studies. 
Defining the IS situation requires knowledge of the analyzed infrastructure, 
the threats and vulnerabilities it is facing and a method to represent the magni-
tude of risk for each component that leads to a thorough picture of the IS situa-
tion. Based on the situation, a plan for risk mitigation can be made. Factors in-
fluencing the IS situation are described and analyzed in the study. They vary 
depending on the types of components used in the infrastructure and the rela-
tions between them. 
One of the modern ways of defining the IS situation is by performing a risk 
analysis of (a part of) the IT infrastructure. A formal way of representing the IT 
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infrastructure – the Enterprise Architecture (EA) – allows a formal definition of 
the existing hardware and software components, legal agreements and business 
processes. Therefore, it gives an ability to represent the role of the IT infrastruc-
ture within the organizational environment. 
Virtualization, being a relatively new paradigm, has revolutionized the ar-
chitecture of the IT infrastructure, as it is no longer required to use dedicated 
hardware for specific processes. Moreover, it motivates the outsourcing of IT 
infrastructure services to third-party vendors, as the costs can be cut down dra-
matically. 
Virtualization technology risk analysis is a very important topic when deal-
ing with modern IT architecture IS. It helps to correctly architect the IT infra-
structure, while minimizing the IS risks of the organization.  
However, lack of methods and implementations for virtualization infor-
mation security risk analysis leaves a gap in this field. A method for information 
security automation for virtualization environments is the cornerstone for the 
virtualization IS, as automated analysis enables unbiased, real-time evaluation of 
the situation with instant reaction to changes.  
Relevance of the Thesis 
The use of virtualization technologies exist in most of the organizations and is 
currently growing. The most typical form of virtualization - Cloud Computing - 
reaches the organization’s IT infrastructure by various services, including e-
mail, file sharing and others. Understanding the virtualization risks and their 
magnitude is crucial in ensuring the IS of these components. 
To fully understand the risks of virtualization, a method, evaluating these 
risks within the context of the organization’s infrastructure and process architec-
ture is required. It can be achieved by analyzing a formally described model. 
Modeling the overall organization’s architecture, including business processes, 
hardware and software can be achieved using the formal Enterprise Architecture 
model. However, lack of special meta-concepts for virtualization components in 
strictly formed Enterprise Architecture models is a drawback, as such compo-
nents cannot be described properly, using dedicated elements. 
Due to the nature of virtualization components of sharing physical re-
sources between the virtual machines – additional threat vectors exist compared 
to the regular single machine computing. Specifying these vectors and acquiring 
metrics is required for successful risk analysis. 
Due to the complex nature of the possible architectures and their compo-
nents in the Enterprise Architecture model as well as the probabilistic output of 
Enterprise Architecture analysis tools, the metrics for the attack vectors are re-
INTRODUCTION 3 
 
quired to be quantitative, i.e. provide numerical scores for the exploitability of 
the existing vulnerabilities.  
While there have been numerous approaches on IS risk analysis, virtualiza-
tion is still vaguely covered. Moreover, a method for information security auto-
mation for virtualization environments to be used in an Enterprise Architecture 
model is not present. 
This research is dedicated to develop a method for quantitative IS risk anal-
ysis for virtualization components that can be implemented to an automated EA 
analysis solution. 
The Object of Research  
The object of this research is information security risk analysis of virtualized 
computer systems. 
The Aim of the Thesis 
The main goal of this research is to provide a method for information security 
risk analysis for virtualized computer systems. 
The Tasks of the Thesis 
The following tasks are executed to achieve the goal: 
1. Review of the existing methods for the evaluation of information se-
curity risk in virtualized systems. 
2. Develop a virtualization threat landscape, defining the scope of the 
virtualization threats. 
3. Propose a method for quantitative risk analysis by adapting existing 
IS threat database data to eliminate and/or support the results of ex-
pert evaluation. 
4. Perform comparative statistical analysis to evaluate the accuracy of 
calculated threat scorings in relation to expertise knowledge and de-
fine its uncertainty. 
5. Evaluate the method improvements in a working Enterprise Architec-
ture analysis system to provide scenario-analysis. 
4 INTRODUCTION 
 
Research Methodology 
Methods of comparative and literature analysis were used to analyze the re-
search object. The literature is chosen based on the impact factor, reputation of 
the author and relevance to the topic. Methods of information security risk anal-
ysis, scoring and threat identification are used to develop a method for virtual-
ization technology information security risk analysis. The methods of experi-
mental research have been used to validate the correctness of the proposed 
method and its implementation. 
Scientific Novelty of the Thesis 
The scientific novelty of this study is specified as follows: 
1. A novel method of virtualization information security risk analysis is 
proposed. It includes an extensive definition of the threat landscape of 
virtualization technologies, association of the threats with covering 
control means, definition of requirements for secure virtualization 
component usage, attack scenarios, and variables influencing the se-
curity of the components.  
2. A new numerical procedure, combining the recent exploitability scor-
ing to define the probability values of the variables, influencing the 
virtualization security is introduced and analyzed. 
3. A new variable scoring correctness validation method using adapted 
statistical procedures for expertise elicitation is proposed. The results 
of this procedure provide calibration and entropy scores of uncertain 
information, therefore novelty uncertainty evaluation of the scoring to 
define the correctness of the scoring.  
Practical Value of the Research Findings 
A method for virtualized system information security risk analysis using expert 
knowledge and validated vulnerability and exploit databases has been proposed. 
This method can be used as a stand-alone tool, or implemented into existing 
tools for information security analysis automation. An implementation of the 
method to the Cyber Security Modeling Language is proposed in this thesis. 
INTRODUCTION 5 
 
The Defended Statements  
The following statements based on the results of present investigation are the 
hypotheses to be defended: 
1. The proposed method allows for the information security risk probabili-
ties to be evaluated from processed vulnerability exploitation scoring of 
Common Vulnerability and Exploit database. 
2. The proposed method substitutes the expert knowledge on virtualiza-
tion information security risk. 
Approval of the Research Findings 
The author has published 4 publications in 4 reviewed scientific journals. The 
author has made three presentations at three scientific conferences: 
• 12th IMEKO TC10 Workshop on Technical Diagnostics: New 
Perspectives in Measurements, Tools and Techniques for Industrial 
Applications. June 6–7, 2013, Florence, Italy. 
• The 2014 International Conference on Information and Network Securi-
ty (ICINS 2014). April 11–12, 2014, Jeju, South Korea. 
• The XXI IMEKO World Congress. August 29–September 5, Prague, 
Czech Republic. 
Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertations consists of 112 pages, includes 20 figures and 18 tables. 
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1 
Virtualization Information Security 
Assurance and Methods 
This chapter provides an overview of existing research in the field virtualization in-
formation security, reviews the theoretical aspects of virtualization technologies, 
information security and its extent. Moreover, methods for information security risk 
analysis and the components for risk modeling are analyzed in this chapter as well as 
various applications of the techniques in real life solutions are presented.  
Recent growth of information technology (IT) application fields across various 
industries has led the industry to dramatic optimization results, thus saving the re-
sources. One of the revolutionary conceptions – virtualization – is not only efficient 
in the monetary perspective, but also if handled correctly – security wise. The threat 
landscape of virtualization technologies is broader compared to traditional compu-
ting technologies due to the fact that physical resources are unavoidably shared, thus 
leaving more opportunities of exploits in this field. This leads to the fact that for vir-
tualization to be beneficial, security must be in the top priorities. 
However, virtualization being a relatively new concept, the methodologies 
for security and risk management of such environments are mostly under devel-
opment (Chandramouli 2014). Moreover, proper security assessment, including 
risk analysis of the virtualization components is important for identification of 
the security strategy aspects. 
The results of experiments, presented in this chapter are published in 
two papers (Janulevičius, Goranin 2013, Janulevičius, Čenys 2014). 
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1.1. Virtualization of Information Technology Systems 
Virtualization is a process of simulating a physical computer on the existing 
hardware platform. It is achieved by using a virtualization layer that decouples 
the computer software from the existing hardware resources. The virtualization 
layer distributes the present hardware resources to the instances of virtualization, 
called virtual machines (SP 800-125: 2011). Virtual machine is a portion of the 
physical resources, dedicated to run as simulation of a physical machine 
(Portnoy 2012). Although the formal requirements for virtualization have been 
defined over fourty years ago (Popek, Goldberg 1974) such kind of technology 
came to prominence only very recently. 
Decoupling of the physical hardware from the software can be beneficial 
when a powerful hardware setup needs to be divided into weaker-resource ma-
chines. On the contrary, when having two machines with less than required 
power, virtualization can serve in merging the resources (Portnoy 2012).  
In real-life applications, virtualization has shown the benefits of resource 
elasticity, saving of energy and isolation of applications. Beyond this, virtualiza-
tion also provides disaster recovery capabilities, fault tolerance ant the ability of 
cloning and migration of virtual machines. Therefore the efficiency of the IT 
increases as most of these processes can be automated using advanced virtual-
ization systems (Ottenheimer, Wallace 2012). 
One of the most successful virtualization applications is the Cloud Compu-
ting. It facilitates the beneficial features of virtualization by providing it as a ser-
vice. This means that the customer of the cloud does not have to worry about the 
physical hardware. Once the service is acquired, the resources can be easily in-
creased by simply adding as many resources from as many physical machines as 
necessary. 
The hypervisor is a layer of software placed between the hardware and one 
or more virtual machines that it supports. Therefore, it controls and manages the 
interactions between virtual machines and the hardware shared by the virtual 
machines. The main hypervisor characteristics are (Popek, Goldberg 1974): 
• provision of an environment identical to the physical environment; 
• providing it with minimal performance cost; 
• retaining complete control of the system resources. 
Two types of hypervisors exist – Type 1 (Fig. 1.1 a) and Type 2 (Fig. 1.1 b) 
differing by the deployment method.  
Type 1 hypervisors run directly on the physical hardware. They communi-
cate directly with the hardware resources. This leads to better performance com-
pared to the Type 2 hypervisors, as less processing overhead is required to run 
the hypervisor. Moreover, they are considered to perform better security-wise, as 
there are less points for security breaches. 
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Physical Machine
Hypervisor
Physical Machine
Hypervisor
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Virtual 
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Virtual 
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Virtual 
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a) b)  
Fig. 1.1. Comparison of: a) Type 1 and b) Type 2 hypervisor architecture (source: author) 
A Type 2 hypervisor runs as an application on an operating system. Support 
for hardware components therefore is inherited from the underlying operating 
system, therefore making it much easier to deploy. However, the processes of 
the underlying systems reduce the performance of such hypervisors. Moreover, 
compatibility issues reduce the reliability of performance (Portnoy 2012). 
Virtual machines serve as an environment for traditional operating systems 
and applications, running on top of a hypervisor or a physical server. Within a 
virtual machine the processes are similar to the ones in a physical machine, 
however there is no dedicated physical hardware. Instead there is a share of a 
resource pool. Virtual machines allow the operating systems to access virtual 
devices, which, from an operating system point of view are considered to be ex-
actly the same as physical ones. 
The most popular realization of such virtualization technologies is Cloud 
Computing. It is a type of service based on the abilities of virtualization, bring-
ing the benefits of resource pooling, scalability and advanced recovery capabili-
ties. National Institute of Standards and Technology defines cloud computing as 
a “model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources that can be rapidly provi-
sioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider inter-
action. This cloud model is composed of five essential characteristics, three ser-
vice models, and four deployment models (SP 800-145: 2011)”. 
The features, characterizing the cloud are (SP 800-145: 2011): 
• on-demand self-service – the user of the cloud computing service can 
adjust the services automatically, without the need of supporting staff; 
• broad network access – all the services can be accessed through the net-
work, without any need of physical access; 
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• resource pooling – the resources of the provider are pooled, using a 
multi-tenant model, so there is no association of services with physi-
cal devices, thus leading to abstract location (e.g. country, datacen-
ter); 
• rapid elasticity – capabilities can be rapidly provisioned by automatical-
ly adjusting the share of pooled resources; 
• measured Service – the services are leveraged and monitored. The costs 
are based on the usage of resources rather than ownership of assets over 
time.  
Cloud Computing is also classified by the service models that they provide, 
defining the levels of responsibility by the user and the service provider (Kavis 
2014). These service models are (as presented in Fig. 1.2): 
• Software as a Service (SaaS). The user can facilitate the provider’s ap-
plications running on a cloud infrastructure. They are accessible from 
client devices through a thin client interface. 
• Platform as a Service (PaaS). The user can deploy consumer-created or 
acquired applications supported by the provider.  
• Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). The user can provision processing, 
storage, networks, and other computing resources, deploy and run arbi-
trary software including operating systems and applications.  
Covered by vendor
Covered by vendor
Covered by vendor
Covered by vendor
Covered by vendor
Covered by vendor
IaaS PaaS SaaS
User
Application
Application 
Stack
Infrastructure
Login
Administration
Registration
Login
Administration
Registration
Login
Administration
Registration
Authentication Authorization
User interface Transactions
Reports D ashboard
Authentication Authorization
User in terface Transactions
Reports Dashboard
Operating 
System
Programming 
language
Application  
server
Middleware
Database M onitoring
 
Fig. 1.2. Responsibility areas based on the cloud computing service model (Kavis 2014)  
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Cloud Computing services can also be classified by the deployment models 
(SP 800-145: 2011): 
• private cloud is operated internally by an organization; 
• community cloud is shared by several organizations. It supports a specif-
ic community with shared concerns; 
• public cloud is available to the general public or a large industry group 
and is owned by an organization selling cloud services; 
• hybrid cloud is a composition of two or more clouds deployment models.  
Most of the service aspects inside the architecture of the cloud, including 
the security issues, are managed by the provider. Therefore the usage of the out-
sourced infrastructure is based on trust between the client and the supplier. Level 
of trust and responsibility from technical aspects is managed by setting up a con-
tractual relationship between the parties. It is typically achieved by applying the 
service level agreement (SLA). An international standard covering this domain 
(ISO/IEC CD 19086-1: 2015) is being prepared, although guidelines for cloud 
service level agreement standardization (European Commission 2014) have al-
ready been published and fully cover the SLA aspect of cloud computing securi-
ty. Based on the resource management architecture provided in (Marinescu 
2013), the SLA is an essential component that must be taken into account. The 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) is described by the relevant Service Level Ob-
jectives (SLOs) based on (European Commission 2014). 
The Service Level Agreement is the cornerstone of contractual agreements 
(Kyriazis 2013) that provides fundamental grounds for (European Commission 
2014): 
1. Quality of Service (QoS) – ensuring that the infrastructure would en-
sure proper quality of service. 
2. Quality of Protection (QoP) – that denotes the means to ensure the in-
formation security. 
The material, presented in this chapter presents the benefits of virtualization 
technologies and the services of Cloud Computing. However, besides these ben-
efits, certain issues of usage exist. One of the most important of these issues is 
ensuring that the information is secure. 
1.2. Information Security 
Information security deals with the protection of information from unauthorized 
use. It is described by three main attributes – Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability. They serve for the following security features (Kissel 2013): 
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• Confidentiality – Preserving authorized restrictions on information ac-
cess and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and 
proprietary information; 
• Integrity – Guarding against improper information modification or de-
struction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and au-
thenticity; 
• Availability – Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of infor-
mation. 
As any other phenomenon, information security requires a metric to define 
the present situation. For this purpose, information security risk analysis is used. 
The objective of a risk analysis is the description of risk. Therefore understand-
ing of the risk concept and how it works is essential to perform risk analysis 
(Aven 2008). 
There is no unanimous agreement upon the meaning of the term “risk”. 
However, commonly “risk” is focused on negative deviation from an expected 
target state (Ackermann 2012). Expectation of an organization can have signifi-
cant deviation from the real situation. Therefore the risk is focused on the uncer-
tainties in relation to the market average values. It serves as the most important 
information security metric. Depending on the type of the risk analysis method, 
the risk either be expressed in a qualitative or quantitative way (Table 1.1).  
Risk Analysis (RA) is a process for estimation of the frequency and impact 
of risk scenarios (ISACA 2013). It serves as the basis for optimizing the pro-
cesses in the planning phase, setting requirements for solutions and measures, 
drawing conclusions on whether these solutions and measures meet the require-
ments and documenting an acceptable risk level (Aven 2008). 
Mathematical risk expression evaluates Risk Exposure (RE) for the proba-
bility (P) of an Unsatisfactory Outcome (UO) multiplied by the loss of this out-
come (Ackermann 2012): 
  =  ∙ 
. (1.1) 
Quantitative risk scoring can be based on the probability-based models. The 
probability-based risk evaluation models provide a description of risk exposure. 
The descriptive scoring is a model function called the Key Risk Indicator (KRI), 
representing the degree to which the analyzed object is subject to the particular 
risk. The particular measure of Value-at-risk (VaR) is the standard risk measure 
used to evaluate the exposure to risk (Panjer 2006). This measure shows the 
amount of effort required to ensure proper functioning of an architecture 
component. 
VaR estimation can be performed by three competing approaches. The his-
torical data approach determines loss probabilities in a statistically nonparamet-
ric way. However, the main drawback of this approach is that historical data 
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may not adequately represent present conditions. The stress testing approach is 
based on calculating losses under various scenarios of unlikely but plausible 
conditions. The Extreme Value Theory (EVT) approach characterises the lower 
tail behaviour of the distribution of returns without tying the analysis down to a 
single parametric family (Smith 2002). 
It is worth noticing that the quantification of risk is dealing with future 
events, which leads to information imperfectness. Moreover, technological de-
velopments tend to modify the risk as the adoption of new technologies bring 
additional threat vectors with them. 
Risk analysis methods are organized into three main categories as presented 
in Table 1.1. 
Table 1.1. Categories of risk analysis methods 
Category Type of Analysis Description 
Simplified RA Qualitative 
Informal procedure, no requirements for 
input or output 
Standard RA 
Qualitative or 
Quantitative 
Formalized procedure, using recognized 
RA methods. Risk matrices are the typical 
output. 
Model-based RA Quantitative 
Event-tree and scenario based analysis 
providing full traceability of conclusions. 
 
The results of risk analysis are relevant if the quality of such analysis is 
high. The quality of risk analysis can be determined depending on the criteria, 
defining the soundness of it. A sound risk analysis must satisfy the following 
requirements (Haimes 2004):  
• Comprehensiveness – the scope of risk analysis should include all the as-
pects of the domain, with a required level of knowledge on each element;  
• Adherence to evidence – every portion of risk assessment should be 
based on hard evidence, including documentation of procedures and pol-
icies as well as evidence of certain functions in operation;  
• Logical soundness – regardless of the proof provided by the evidence, 
the process of risk analysis should follow the principles of logic. Items, 
included in the analysis must reflect to the investigated problem;  
• Practicality – the output of the risk analysis should be practical. This 
means that based on the risk analysis report, actions and inferences 
should be possible to draw to improve the situation;  
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• Openness to evaluation – every step of the process should be well docu-
mented and clear, keeping in mind the idea, that anyone interested in the 
process should be able to understand it solely from the description itself;  
• Explicit assumptions and premises as a basis – only assumptions and 
premises that are clear and are well-based should be used for the risk 
analysis; 
• Compatibility with institutions – aligning the risks to the institutionary 
requirements is essential to have a regulatory compliant output; 
• Conduciveness to learning – the process of risk analysis should be the 
basis for learning and should be adapted to the things learned; 
• Attuning to risk communication – if possible, risk analysis should be per-
formed in a way that the output follows a certain protocol, so that a stand-
ardized way of communicating the risk situation can be established;  
• Innovativeness – as risks are always developing and changing, the inno-
vativeness of the process has to be built in and follow the trend of the 
newly arising changes. 
If the risk analysis satisfies the following criteria, it can be used as a meas-
ure for defining the information security situation. Information security within 
the organization is considered as a directing and supporting concept in the pro-
tection of the information assets from intentional or unintentional disclosure, 
modification, destruction, or denial. It is achieved by implementing appropriate 
information security and organizational planning policies, procedures, and 
guidelines. 
Information security risk analysis is a technique to identify and assess fac-
tors that may have negative influence on the success of achieving a goal from 
the perspective of information technology. Risk analysis also involves definition 
of preventive measures to reduce the probability of these factors from occurring. 
Also, it includes identification of the required countermeasures to successfully 
deal with such constraints when they develop. The identified risks can be used to 
support the development of system requirements, including security needs 
(Peltier 2010).  
The process of information security risk analysis consists of the compo-
nents presented in Fig. 1.3. 
Asset Definition Threat Identification
Prob. of Occurrence 
Determination
Threat Impact 
Determination
Recommendation of 
Controls
Documentation
 
Fig. 1.3. Main components of the information security risk analysis process (Peltier 2010) 
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Information security risk analysis is a part of the information security life 
cycle, where it provides the initial information required for the successful infor-
mation security management. The information security life cycle is presented in 
Fig. 1.4. 
Risk 
Assessment
Cost/Benefit 
Analysis
Implementation
Vulnerability 
Assessment
Risk Analysis
 
Fig. 1.4. Information security life cycle (Peltier 2010) 
Risk analysis consists of the following steps (ISO 27005: 2011): 
• Risk Identification: 
o Identification of Assets – producing a finite list of IT related 
assets that are taken into account for the analysis; 
o Identification of Threats – specifying the threats based on the 
assets; 
o Identification of Existing Controls – specifying 
countermeasures for the existing threats; 
o Identification of Vulnerabilities – specifying the uncovered 
areas of the security aspects; 
o Identification of Consequences – specifying probable scenarios. 
• Risk Estimation: 
o Assessment of Consequences; 
o Assessment of Incident Likelihood; 
o Level of Risk Estimation. 
Several methodologies for information security risk analysis exist. They 
differ by the field of application, nature of the output and the purpose of the 
analysis. Moreover, they differ by the terminology used for the process. This 
study focuses on the process applicability for risk analysis rather than the 
specific term used to describe it, therefore “method” and “methodology” are 
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considered equal, disregarding the differences of the semantic meaning of the 
two terms. 
The research of the available information security risk analysis methods is 
based on the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
Inventory of Risk Management and Risk Assessment Methods has resulted in 
sixteen methods including the Austrian IT Security Handbook 
(Bundeskanzleramt 2013), CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method 
(CRAMM) (Yazar 2002), Coras (Braber et al. 2006), Dutch A&K Analysis 
(Dutch Ministry of Internal Affairs 1996), EBIOS (French National Information 
Systems Security Agency 2011), FAIR (Jones 2011), FRAP (Peltier 2000), 
IRAM2 (Information Security Forum 2014), OCTAVE (Alberts, Dorofee 2002), 
MAGERIT (Lopez et al. 2005), Marion (CLUSIF 1998), MEHARI (CLUSIF 
2011), MIGRA, RiskSafe Assessment, IT-Grundschutz (BSI 2008) and ISAMM 
(Fenz et al. 2014) methods. The detailed description of the methodologies is pre-
sented in Annex A. 
The comparison of the existing risk analysis methodologies provides a sys-
tematic approach of representing the sixteen of the most widely used methodol-
ogies and their features as well as compliance to National and International 
standards. Based on the analysis of the existing methodologies, presented in An-
nex A it is observed that the majority (13/16) of the methodologies are designed 
for the qualitative analysis of information security risk. Two of them (Annex A: 
M04 and M11) are obsolete and no longer used. 13 methodologies declare com-
pliance with existing international or national standards, most popular of which 
is the ISO/IEC 27000 family of standards (9/16). Four of them are commercial 
(Annex A: M08, M13–M14, M16). The analysis has also revealed that the 
methodologies typically consist of several steps (“phases”, “steps” and “stages” 
are considered as synonyms of different method descriptions in this case), defin-
ing the objectives of the risk analysis, threats and controls, and performing the 
risk analysis. 
Methodologies, analysed in this chapter are used as reference material for 
further research and the development of the proposed method. 
Information security risk modeling involves the detailed description of the 
prerequisites, important for risk analysis. The categories of aspects to be de-
scribed in such model are presented in Fig. 1.3. 
Due to the fact that risk is dealing with future events, a concept of uncer-
tainty is introduced to risk modeling, thus defining the risk modeling to be of 
probabilistic (stochastic) nature. Probabilistic modeling deals with uncertainty of 
variables and parameters describing the structure of the elements and constrains.  
Uncertainty is defined as a phenomenon where “potential outcomes cannot 
be described in terms of objectively known probability distributions, nor can 
they be estimated by subjective probabilities (Haimes 2004)”. 
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In the process of risk modeling likelihood of possible undesired deviations 
from the plan through objective or subjective probabilities ar assessed. After-
wards, causal relationships between the sources of risk and their impacts are 
modeled. Quantification of the random and decision variables and the relations 
of these variables to the state variables, objective functions, and constraints is 
considered to be the crucial step in the risk analysis process (Haimes 2004).  
When dealing with complex situations, advanced tools and methods for risk 
analysis are required. Such tools and methods are presented in the next chapter. 
1.3. Information Security Modeling and Analysis 
Management of complex information technology (IT) infrastructure requires 
specific solutions for automation because such infrastructure typically faces con-
stant dynamic changes. Since the introduction of Enterprise Architecture (EA) 
concept, there have been numerous approaches in systemizing and automating 
the management of the IT infrastructure. One of the sensitive domains of the 
EA – the IT infrastructure security assessment – requires in-depth analysis and 
expertise as well as a design, responsive to changes to ensure proper operation of 
the IT applications. Comprehensive and detailed EA models serve as reference 
models for such analysis. Moreover, modern EA modelling language based tools 
have built-in analysis and assessment capabilities.  
Providing sufficient resources for cyber security risk analysis is challenging 
resource-wise, therefore usually found almost exclusively only in security ori-
ented and large enterprises. Meanwhile small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
typically tend to have limited resources, thus requiring combined solutions, ca-
pable to serve both for security as well as business process modelling. Having a 
cybersecurity oriented EA model, designed in a security-assessment-specific EA 
modelling language, enables automatic cyber security assessment of the archi-
tecture. However, enterprise management-related data, including the security-
oriented architecture model information is organized in an enterprise-friendly 
form. Extraction of such information and transformation of it to a form suitable 
for EA modelling language with analytic features enables automation of cyber 
security assessment of an EA. 
Architectural modeling languages is a very important component in man-
agement and development of information systems. Modeling languages such as 
SySML (Friedenthal et al. 2014), Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN) 
(Chinosi, Trombetta 2012) enable creation of information system architecture 
and system environment through diagrams that can be used for various forms of 
analysis, one of which is security. Moreover, they offer extensions for Industrial 
Control System Security Analysis (Lemaire, Lapon 2014), and on top layer, 
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Cloud Security (Machida et al. 2011). Moreover, there are various tools availa-
ble for this purpose including CORAS and its’ extension for ISO standard com-
pliance (Beckers et al. 2014), MulVAL (Ou et al. Appel 2005) or NetSPA (Artz 
2002). 
However, the modeling languages do not offer the required reasoning, 
while the tools either suffer from being subjective or vague, or even obsolete. 
Thus, there are some solutions that offer modeling capabilities along with the 
reasoning based on the systemized expert knowledge base. One of them is 
OpenMADS (Andrade et al. 2013), the other is Cyber Security Modeling Lan-
guage (CySeMoL) (Sommestad et al. 2013). A comparison of the existing tools 
and methods is provided in Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2. Comparison of the existing Architectural modeling language for Cyber Security 
risk analysis  
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1. CySeMoL YES YES YES YES YES YES 
2. CORAS YES YES YES NO YES NO 
3. Common 
Criteria 
NO NO YES YES YES NO 
4. OpenMADS YES YES YES NO YES NO 
5. MulVAL NO NO YES NO NO NO 
6. NetSPA YES YES YES NO NO NO 
 
Using Enterprise Architecture Security Assessment Tools, such as Cyber 
Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) for implementation of information 
security related models provides the end user with improved accessibility and 
the ability to assess critical areas of the design prior to its’ deployment, prevent-
ing possible damages. Therefore, implementation of cloud security assessment 
model comes as a natural solution to this problem. Moreover, since CySeMoL 
already covers a broad range of domains of enterprise architecture, cloud securi-
ty assessment enables users of the system to cover their complete IT infrastruc-
ture that, in case of an enterprise, is a combination of diverse technology 
(Sommestad et al. 2013). On top of it, the decision makers of the enterprise re-
quire solutions for cyber security estimation that are easy to understand (Holm 
et al. 2013). And the CySeMoL provided easy-to-understand graphical output of 
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the situation suits this requirement well. Therefore, this study uses the CySeMoL 
as a basis. 
CySeMoL is defined as a modeling framework and calculation engine for 
estimation of the cyber security of enterprise-level system architectures. Within 
the CySeMoL the knowledge of the possible attacks is included, therefore the 
framework operates as an expert system. Such solution only requires the system 
architecture as an input. Modeling and calculation of the vulnerabilities is 
achieved using the Predictive, Probabilistic Architecture Modeling Framework 
(P2AMF) which extends the Object Constraint Language (OCL) to be used for 
probabilistic assessment and prediction of the properties. This framework 
enables the expression of uncertainties, relations and attributes in Unified 
Modeling Language (UML) and perform assessments using these uncertainties. 
The P2AMF creates a prediction model, representing the predicted situation. 
1.4. Information Security Risk Analysis in 
Virtualizated Systems 
Virtualization came to prominence rather recently but the exponential speed of 
growth of usage of it has drawn a major interest from many perspectives. They 
range from resource optimization to the security concerns and their solutions. As 
the latter has the main focus – the overview of research is targeted to the existing 
scientific research on virtualization information security. 
Virtualization security was first publicly noticed as an issue over ten years 
ago by W. Wong (2005). The author notices the raising usage of virtualization 
for more powerful processes and notices the need to evaluate and ensure the se-
curity of virtualized systems. Since then, rapid growth of interest has been ob-
served for this topic and various approaches have been analyzed for this matter. 
One of the early approaches by S. Vaarala contribute to the field of virtualization 
security by providing a threat model, including available security mechanisms 
with recommendations for security improvements through virtualization 
(Vaarala 2006). Garfinkel and Warfield analyzed the virtualization impact as a 
security measure and pointed out the benefits of data isolation and snapshot abil-
ities as the arguments against the traditional computing (Garfinkel, Warfield 
2007). Finally in 2008 Vaughan-Nichols published an introductory article about 
the virtualization security concerns (Vaughan-Nichols 2008). 
But not only scientific approaches are observed. From the technical point of 
view, the first virtualization risk and risk management considerations were 
raised rather recently as well, when McAfee’s Foundstone released a whitepaper 
on virtualization and risk (Hau, Araujo 2007), introducing the need of risk as-
sessment for virtualized systems. Later developments build on this topic, analyz-
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ing secure virtualization configuration (Hietala 2009) and server virtualization 
security and risk evaluation by L. Kai (2012). 
Most of the virtualization security research, however, focuses on cloud 
computing. Technical reports on cloud computing security assessment (Context 
Information Security 2011) deal with this topic based on technical documenta-
tion, issued by trusted sources. One of the sources, the ENISA report on Cloud 
Computing (Catteddu, Hogben 2009) provides a generous amount of possible 
vulnerabilities, covering the most of the domain. Cloud computing specific secu-
rity issues in various researches are classified according to specific service mod-
els by which different types of services are delivered to the end user (Subashini, 
Kavitha 2011; Modi et al. 2013). Specific cases of security and privacy have 
been discussed in number of researches and surveys with the most up to date and 
comprehensive being and pointing out the latest tendencies of scientific re-
searches (Alia et al. 2015). Gruschka and Jensen (2010) are of the first to intro-
duce a cloud computing scenario security model using attack vectors based on 
three classes of participants: users, services and providers. In this model, every 
cloud computing scenario interaction can be addressed to two entities. There-
fore, every attack vector here is detailed as a set of three-class bi-directional 
model interactions. These studies serve as the basis for the baseline cloud com-
puting security. 
However, no study to provide quantitative characteristics for describing risk 
in the field of cloud computing have been observed in this research. This is par-
tially solved in the field of doctoral thesis – where one of the main reference 
works – a very thorough dissertation, published as a study on IT Security risk 
management dealing with perceived IT Security risks in the context of Cloud 
Computing (Ackermann 2012) – provides a quantitative empirical survey to ex-
amine how potential users perceive IT security risks and how these risk estima-
tions affect the adoption of Cloud Computing. The research takes an even deeper 
approach by investigating the scenario parameter effect to the distribution of 
potential losses. Regardless of the sophistication of this work, however, it can be 
referred to, but does not cover the method for the numerical procedures to obtain 
the risk evaluation scores. 
Thesis by M. Carroll (2012) focuses on the governance of cloud computing 
and virtualization, providing a set of legislative requirements to deal with virtu-
alization and cloud computing. This framework contributes to the contractual 
requirement portion of the research. 
Other worth noticing doctoral dissertations include T. Garfinkel (2010). In 
this dissertation several paradigms for enhancing host security leveraging are 
introduced. They include virtualization based approach to trusted computing 
allowing multiple virtual hosts with different assurance levels to run concurrent-
ly on the same platform using a novel “open box” and “closed box” model, vir-
1. VIRTUALIZATION INFORMATION SECURITY ASSURANCE AND METHODS 21 
 
tual machine introspection an approach to enhancing the attack resistance, intru-
sion detection and prevention systems and overshadowing data protection ap-
proach for providing a last line of defense for application data even if the guest 
OS running an application has been compromised. 
From the technical perspective, Z. Wang (2012) has conducted a research 
for hypervisor integrity assurance as the basis for the doctoral thesis. A new sys-
tem – HyperSafe, enabling the self-protection for Type I hypervisors has been 
proposed. It combines two techniques, non-bypassable memory lockdown and 
restricted pointer indexing. Another system for Type II hypervisor integrity – the 
HyperLock for secure isolation of a vulnerable or compromised type-II hypervi-
sor has been proposed, including hypervisor isolation runtime and hypervisor 
shadowing. Finally an anti-rootkit solution called HookSafe has been proposed 
in this thesis. This, combined with another technical solution by J. Szefer (2013) 
proposes a method to leverage hardware to help provide protection for data exe-
cution inside virtual machines on the remote cloud servers. Szefer also introduc-
es a new threat, associated with virtualization – extraction of sensitive or confi-
dential code or data from virtual machines using an attacker with virtualization 
layer privileges. These works have contributed to the forming of the overall pic-
ture of the cloud computing security situation, and therefore – the threat land-
scape of the field. 
1.5. Virtualization and Cloud Computing Security 
Research in Lithuania 
The field of information security is within the focus areas of Lithuanian 
researchers. Therefore, plenty of approaches towards the development or 
improvement of portions of information security exist. Special interests for 
researchers include cryptography, with applications in protocol level 
(Sakalauskas et al. 2007) as well as as its applications (Sakalauskas et al. 2010), 
infrastructure analysis (Kajackas, Rainys 2011) and even legislative issues 
(Stitilis et al. 2011). 
Research of virtualization and cloud computing has not been in the main 
focus in Lithuania. However, there are some notable works in the field. A rootkit 
detection experiment within a virtual environment has been carried out to 
present a framework for investigation of kernel-level rootkit behaviour within 
the virtual environments (Toldinas et al. 2015). From the forensic point of view, 
virtualization security issues are dealt with by Goranin and Mažeika, providing a 
methodology for forensics in virtualization (Goranin, Mažeika 2011). 
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1.6. Conclusions of the First Chapter and 
Formulation of the Dissertation Tasks 
The first chapter of this thesis provides an overview and definition of the domain 
specific concepts. It includes aspects of their implementation and operation as 
well as comparison between the various modifications. The following 
conclusions have been drawn: 
1. The overview of the risk analysis methods has revealed the lack of 
ability of such methods to evaluate virtualization related risks. 
2. Sixteen most widely used risk analysis methodologies and their fea-
tures have been analysed. The analysis of the existing methodologies, 
presented in Annex A shows that the majority (13/16) of the method-
ologies are designed for the qualitative analysis of information securi-
ty risk. Two of them (Annex A: M04 and M11) are obsolete and no 
longer used. 13 methodologies declare compliance with existing in-
ternational or national standards, most popular of which is the 
ISO/IEC 27000 family of standards (9/16). Four of them are commer-
cial (Annex A: M08, M13–M14, M16). 
3. The reviewed scientific research literature provides a strong foundation 
for virtualization and cloud computing security assurance, spanning 
from governance and management issues to the very technical details 
for the assurance of security. However, lack of research in the field of 
virtualization security risk analysis has directed this research towards 
the development of a new structured way to analyze the information 
security risks that affect virtualization technologies. 
Based on the conclusions, the following tasks are formulated to achieve the 
goal: 
1. Review of the existing methods for the evaluation of information se-
curity risk in virtualized systems. 
2. Develop a virtualization threat landscape, defining the scope of the 
virtualization threats. 
3. Propose a method for quantitative risk analysis by adapting existing 
IS threat database data to eliminate and/or support the results of ex-
pert evaluation. 
4. Perform comparative statistical analysis to evaluate the accuracy of 
calculated threat scorings in relation to expertise knowledge and de-
fine its uncertainty. 
5. Evaluate the method improvements in a working Enterprise Architec-
ture analysis system to provide scenario-analysis. 
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2 
Risk Analysis Modeling and 
Application for Virtualization 
Technologies 
This chapter provides the knowledge and links between the methods to allow 
building a thorough model of virtualization information security risks. It in-
cludes the existing infrastructure, contractual agreements, up-to-date threat 
sources and means to control them and expert evaluation into account. The out-
come of this chapter is a newly proposed method for virtualization information 
security risk analysis based on the newest scientific research in the field. 
2.1. Method for Quantitative Information Security 
Risk Analysis for Virtualization Technologies 
The components of this method are based on a combination of well-established 
and validated methods (Beckers 2015), (ISO 27005:2011). Together, these 
methods provide a framework to organize the present data, and based on it – 
provide a scientific approach for a quantified evaluation of risks. The processes 
of this method are required to: 
1. Define the coverage of the threats for the researched area. 
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2. Link the threats with the control means that cover them. 
3. Define and specify the attack scenarios associated with the research 
area. 
4. Define the most important variables influencing the risk magnitude of 
each analyzed attack scenario. 
5. Acquire numerical values for each variable through an experimental 
research. 
6. Validate the numerical risk values by a separate independent experi-
mental research. 
As the nature of the application of this method requires, these main steps 
are expanded by the following: the security controls are organized into larger 
security requirement groups for easier analysis and input minimization, attack 
scenarios are introduced to provide the traceability of the analysis and result val-
idation is introduced to prove the correctness of the method performance. 
The process, used to achieve the objectives of the method, is graphically 
presented in Fig. 2.1. 
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Fig. 2.1. The flowchart of processes of the proposed risk analysis method (Source: author) 
As seen from Fig. 2.1 the method has four input channels. It generates one 
output – risk, expressed as a probability. The rest of this chapter is dedicated to 
describe the methods to achieve the required results, including the collection of 
input data, the processing and the output. 
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The proposed virtualization risk analysis and management method is de-
signed to be quantitative and easily applicable to probabilistic evaluation. To 
achieve this goal the following is performed:  
• the amount of input information is sorted by grouping the controls 
into requirements; 
• attack scenarios are defined for automated machine reasoning; 
• variables are introduced for detailed output of risk probabilities; 
• quantitative risk analysis is performed to generate a probabilistic 
output for the virtualization component information security risk. 
The method consists of threat identification and selection of control means 
to cover the threats. The next step is to match countermeasures covering each 
control mean, link them and combine to provide the minimum amount of coun-
termeasures for consistent risk analysis. Therefore the method consists of the 
following: 
• definition of threats – taxonomical classification of the threats; 
• definition of controls – threat association with the hypervisor spe-
cific control means; 
• definition of security requirements – proposal of the requirements 
representing the controls; 
• definition of attack scenarios – attack scenario association with the 
security requirements; 
• definition of attack variables – assignment of the main attack varia-
bles; 
• definition of attack variable scores – association of the exploitabil-
ity scores with the variables; 
• evaluation – risk evaluation based on the collected data; 
• validation – risk evaluation validation based on the expert data. 
The proposed method for virtualization information security risk analysis is 
of quantitative nature. The output of the analysis is the probability of risk that 
represents the likelihood of one or more professional penetration testers to suc-
cessfully complete the attack step in the object model within the time designated 
for the attack. These probabilities are based on the estimates for the attack steps 
associated with it (Holm et al. 2013). Quantitative methods benefit over the 
qualitative ones by providing a more accurate image of risk and enabling quanti-
tative cost-benefit analysis but at the same time requiring greater expertise of the 
field (Lee 2014).  
Threat identification is performed using an own-developed reference virtu-
alization security threat taxonomy (presented in subchapter 1.2.2) that provides a 
thorough landscape of the threats and threat sources that the virtualization com-
ponents may face. Controls for these threats (presented in subchapter 1.2.3) are 
described and linked to provide a mitigation plan for the threats. The realization 
of regulatory controls for the threats in a practical approach consists of specific 
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solutions, serving as one or more controls that mitigate the risk. Data required 
for variable definition – the attack scenarios, that describe the nature of the vari-
ables and the variable scores that assign a numerical value to the variables are 
presented in subchapter 1.2.4. 
To be able to solve the problem, it is necessary to understand the scope 
and the broadness of the problem in the first place. The first step is to define 
the limits, within which, the problem exists. Knowledge of the analyzed 
field requires a formal representation, which is typically organized to serve 
the purpose of the research in the most convenient way. Organizing the 
knowledge enables the definition of the research domain limits. Choosing 
taxonomy over an ontology in this approach is based on the requirement of 
the knowledge to be of an easily definable and classifiable domain for tax-
onomy (and as opposed – universal bodies of knowledge for ontologies) 
(Smiraglia 2014).  
It includes construction of a taxonomy consisting of the component en-
tities of the domain. A low-level “ad-hoc” taxonomy is required to define 
the coverage of the area as the definition requires a clear specification of 
knowledge. Hierarchical classification is a classification arranged according 
to the general-specific relations. Providing a hierarchical order in the classi-
fication process organizes the knowledge in a convenient, easy readable 
form.  
A classification is considered appropriate if it has the following properties 
(Smiraglia 2014): 
• Systematic – have rules for inclusion of component entities to a 
class, division or sub-division; 
• Expansible – the design has the built-in flexibility to be expanded; 
• Well described entities – all single and composite subject concepts 
should have designations assigned and have a location in the classifi-
cation.  
Building a taxonomy includes determination of the domain and scope, 
review of subject domain authorities, extraction of concepts, organization of 
concepts and validation. In the case of this thesis, a new taxonomy is needed, 
as the existing approaches do not cover the whole threat landscape (subchap-
ter 1.2.2). 
Risk evaluation process assigns a value to a certain risk factor. It is a 
multi-perspective measure, incorporating the evaluation of threat occurrence 
likelihood and impact analysis. Based on the nature of the risk analysis 
method (Table 1.1), the output of the risk evaluation can be qualitative or 
quantitative. As the proposed method deals with quantitative risk analysis, it 
requires incorporating a method to provide a quantitative risk evaluation. 
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In the case of this method, risk is evaluated using two sources of infor-
mation. At first, to define the objectives of the risk analysis the variables rep-
resenting the objectives are specified. To achieve the quantitative infor-
mation about these variables statistically processed scores of widely 
recognized vulnerability databases are used. The validation of this quantifi-
cation is then achieved by collecting expert knowledge and comparing it to 
the variable scores. 
To gain quantitative measures of security risk model, based on a qualita-
tive nature is a complicated task as risk measurement is typically of the qual-
itative nature (Creswell 2003). A study on security risk model parameter 
quantification (Ryan et al. 2012) suggests using a well-established method of 
expert judgement elicitation for the needs of information security. Moreover, 
this study suggests and validates the point that sound results can be achieved 
using a set of experts as small as twenty-one individuals. 
An expert is considered to be a skilful, well trained person with exten-
sive knowledge in a specific field. Such expert provides an opinion in the 
process of expert elicitation (Ayyub 2001). The methods of expert elicitation 
can be of direct and indirect nature.  
The indirect methods are based on betting rates by experts to reach a 
point of indifference among presented options related to an issue. Such 
methods, however, have a major disadvantage – the utility value of money is 
not necessarily linear with the options presented to an expert, and the utility 
value of money is independent of the answer to an issue, such as failure rate. 
However, indirect techniques are useful to elicit probabilities from probabil-
ity-illiterate experts as real-life values are used to estimate the probabilities. 
Direct methods elicit a direct estimate of the degree of belief of an ex-
pert on some issue. Direct methods include the Delphi method designed for 
technological forecasting and policy analysis and risk studies as well as the 
nominal group technique which allows iterative evaluation where a struc-
tured discussion is conducted after the experts have provided initial opinions 
and the final judgment is made individually on a second cycle of opinion 
elicitation and aggregated mathematically similar to the Delphi method 
(Ayyub 2001). 
The main issue when dealing with expert data is the uncertainty of the 
metrics caused by bias of individual experts that arises due to their back-
ground. The Cooke classical model (Cooke 1991) offers a solution for syn-
thesizing the expert knowledge of various individuals by assigning weights 
to their judgement based on their ability to estimate the true value of the seed 
questions, which have known answers prior to the study. Seed questions help 
identifying the most suitable individuals for the study by defining their rele-
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vance to the background knowledge and the ability to quantify their 
knowledge (Ryan et al. 2012). 
Virtualization security extends the attack surface of the host-based com-
puting with additional attack surfaces caused by virtualization and network-
ing issues. Therefore, it is important to understand the complete attack sur-
face to avoid the inconsistency of the security strategy due to undocumented 
weak links. Multiple approaches of describing the virtualization attack sur-
face exist, the most comprehensive of which are described below. 
Pearce et al. have proposed a study on the security threats and solutions 
for virtualization. The authors suggest a virtualization threat classification 
into three categories, the causes being: strong virtualization properties, core 
virtualization implementation and control software and data flows (Pearce et 
al. 2013). 
A special publication by the National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology (NIST) offers security recommendation for hypervisor deployment. 
In this publication, the recommendations are based on a set of potential 
threats, organized into five categories as well as supplemental threat source 
description (Chandramouli 2014). The areas of execution isolation, devices 
emulation and access control, execution of privileged operations for guest 
systems by the hypervisor, virtual machine management as well as host and 
hypervisor software are covered in this publication. 
From the commercial application point of view, SANS Institute has re-
viewed and organized the virtualization threats and hardening process of 
commercial virtualization solutions (Shackleford 2010). This study provides 
the controls based on the facing threats as well as deployment and configura-
tion recommendations for commercial virtualization products.  
Other studies covering the description of virtualization threats to a cer-
tain extent include Gupta and Kumar research on the virtualization threats, 
provided as a taxonomy of cloud security, organizing the threats into two 
main categories – the hypervisor and the virtual machine threats (Gupta, 
Kumar 2013). Another study worth mentioning is carried out by Hashemi 
and Ardakani (Hashemi, Ardakani 2012). The taxonomy of the security as-
pects of cloud computing systems partially covers the virtualization issues as 
well. 
The study by Pearce et al. (2013) focuses on the technical threats, most-
ly arising from the hypervisor and virtual machine interaction, thus lacking 
threats arising from the virtualization management. The NIST special publi-
cation deals with the hypervisor deployment issues, while the SANS Institute 
whitepaper covers the aspects of real-life virtualization implementation sce-
narios.  
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2.2. The Proposed Virtualization Security Threat 
Taxonomy 
Virtualization security assessment requires a base point, consisting of known 
security threats that the technology is facing. Analysis of the existing re-
search in this field revealed that although studies proposing virtualization 
security categorization exist, they represent a specific field of application, 
thus limiting the threat analysis to a certain point of view – technical (Pearce 
et al. 2013), hypervisor deployment and governance (Chandramouli 2014) 
and commercial product deployment (Shackleford 2010). However, the re-
search of this paper aims at providing a multi-perspective risk analysis for 
virtualization solutions. The comparison is conducted using the threat lists, 
provided in the three documents. The overlapping threat entries are merged. 
This merged threat list has resulted in thirty entries. It is assumed that such 
categorization approach provides a full virtualization threat landscape to en-
sure the completeness of the analysis.  
As seen in Table 2.1. the results of the analysis of existing virtualization in-
formation security threat taxonomies has revealed that there is no approach cov-
ering the whole threat landscape. 
As a result of this comparison, a taxonomy, combining all the threats 
found in the threat landscapes is proposed. As the three analyzed sources dif-
fer by the application field (technical) (Pearce et al. 2013), hypervisor de-
ployment and governance (Chandramouli 2014) and commercial product de-
ployment (Shackleford 2010) as stated above), the proposed taxonomy 
represents a complete virtualization threat landscape. Other categorization 
approaches are disregarded, as the threats presented in them fully overlap 
with the threats of the three main taxonomies. The proposed taxonomy is 
presented in Fig. 2.2. 
The virtualization threats in the proposed taxonomy are organized into two 
categories and six subcategories. It ensures that this representation is clear and 
the information, required for analysis of the threat origin, is sufficient. The 
threats are organized according to (Steiner 2012). This document suggests that 
the threats of virtualization are of logical, physical and premise security nature. 
The presence of virtualization extends the threat landscape compared to tradi-
tional computing by adding additional threats, related to the hypervisor (a layer 
between the hardware resource pool and virtual machines), unknown geograph-
ical location of the stored data, data breaches between the virtual machines with-
in the same hypervisor and management of virtual network security and moni-
toring. To emphasize the importance of virtualization in this taxonomy 
virtualization specific threats are placed under Logical Security category, while 
the physical and premise security threats are placed under category Other. 
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Table 2.1. Comparison of the existing virtualization security threat landscapes 
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1. Compromise of VN Traffic Confidentiality  +  
2. MAC Address Spoofing  +  
3. Abuse of Ports and Services  +  
4. Management Network Abuse  +  
5. Denial of Service Attacks  +  
6. Hyperjacking (Rootkit) +  + 
7. Hypervisor Compromise   + 
8. Data Leakage Through Shared Memory  +  
9. Exploitation of Unnecessary Virtual De-
vices 
+ +  
10. Data Leakage Through External Devices  +  
11. Hypervisor Trust Model Breaches   + 
12. Hypervisor Intervention   + 
13. Dataflow Breaches   + 
14. Virtualization Attacks   + 
15. Guest System Attacks and Compromise +   
16. Isolation Breaches +   
17. Unauthorized Access  +  
18. Brute Force Access  +  
19. Privilege Abuse and Escalation Attacks  + + 
20. Over-Privilege Abuse + +  
21. Man-in-the-middle Attacks  +  
22. Exposure to Untrusted Networks  +  
23. Attacks on Unhardened Host Systems + +  
24. VM Cloning   + 
25. VM Nonlinearity Breaches   + 
26. Control Channel Breaches   + 
27. VM Migration +   
28. No Access Monitoring Requirements  +  
29. No Forensics and Incident Response  +  
30. No Regulatory Compliance  +  
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Virtualization Specific threats consist of Network Security Related and Hy-
pervisor Related. While Network Security Related threats seem to be more ge-
neric then Virtualization Specific, it is worth mentioning that the selected threats 
of this category deal with network virtualization issues.  
The Hypervisor Related threats are in the main focus of this study. They are 
organized into five sections: 
• HC: Hypervisor Core Implementation – Consists of security impli-
cations due to unmet requirements and leads to transparency and 
resource control breaches. 
• GH: Guest/Host System Interaction – Security implications caused 
by interactions of VMs with the host fall in this category. 
• UG: User and Group Security – Security implications due to im-
proper implementation of authorization and authentication controls. 
• HM: Hypervisor Management Server – Misuse of management 
controls and protocols leads to gaining unauthorized privileges than 
may be exploited. 
• LA: Logging and Auditing – Security implications due to unmet 
compliance mandates and disability to perform forensics in case of 
an incident fall in this category. 
The Hypervisor Core Implementation (HC) specifies the threats of Hyper-
jacking and Hypervisor Compromise that are dependent of the way the hypervi-
sor is implemented and configured. 
Hyperjacking is considered to be one of the upcoming virtualization threats. 
It works by placing malicious control over the hypervisor, thus infecting virtual 
machines and having certain advantages over the users of the operating systems 
within the VM. While the automated threat detection solutions do not search for 
malicious activities at the VM level, stealthy activities become possible. Hyper-
jacking can be realized in four different types depending on the way it acts 
(Rutkowska 2006). 
Hypervisor Compromise is expanded into three sub-concepts of Introspec-
tion, Alteration and Guest System DoS Attacks. Introspection is caused when 
the hypervisor has full low-level visibility of operation and can intervene it. Hy-
pervisor alteration is caused by a compromised hypervisor and can affect all the 
running virtual machines. Moreover, the hardware supporting the hypervisor can 
be affected as well. Guest system DoS attacks exploit the hypervisor bugs as 
well as resource starvation to compromise the availability of a guest system 
(Pearce et al. 2013). 
Guest/Host System Interaction (GH) specifies the threats caused by the vir-
tualization environment and the virtual instances. Most typically they include 
various types of data leakage and other isolation breaches. 
Threats falling to this category include Data Leakage through Shared 
Memory and External Devices. Since virtual machines share the same physical 
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hardware, there is a possibility of data leakage through shared hardware compo-
nents. Compromising the shared memory and altering the identifiers of owner-
ship of information portions leads to arbitrary acquisition of information. More-
over, inconsistent hypervisor trust model and disregarding of the least privilege 
principle, allowing unnecessary ports and services may lead to exploitation of 
security issues, unknown to the owner (Schneider 2004), such as dataflow 
breaches. 
The guest system, running over the hypervisor also faces threats, caused by 
compromised hypervisor (through hypervisor intervention), as it controls the 
processes and hardware management for the guest system. Thus, threats like 
desktop Virtualization Attacks, Guest System Attack and Compromise and other 
Isolation Breaches exist. 
User and Group Security (UG) specifies the threats caused by misuse of ac-
cess control management. They include unauthorized access, brute force access, 
as well as privilege abuse and escalation related attacks. 
Hypervisor Management Server (HM) specifies the threats arising of mis-
usage of management layer of the hypervisor that tends to have higher privileg-
es. Apart of the over-privilege abuse, threats of control channel breaches, expo-
sure to untrusted networks, VM nonlinearity, man-in-the-middle attacks and VM 
migration fall in this category. 
Logging and Auditing (LA) is the regulatory and forensic threat group, 
where compliance to certain security management documentation and non-
existent forensic capabilities are the main threat sources. 
The proposed taxonomy is evaluated based on the National Information Stand-
ards Organization standard ANSI/NISO Z39.19 (ANSI 2010) and the main re-
quirements of: 
• Structure: hierarchical classification of information – this is repre-
sented by the number of (sub)categories. The proposed taxonomy 
that has 8 exceeds the nearest approach by two (sub)categories ad-
ditionally providing three levels of subcategorization for easier im-
plementation; 
• Comprehensiveness: the taxonomy should cover the objective do-
main – the number of nodes in the proposed taxonomy – 34 ex-
ceeds the nearest approach by fifteen entries; 
• Soundness: the taxonomy should meet the standard requirements – 
the number of narrower terms for a broader term falls into the rec-
ommended range of [3; 20], the identifiers for each node for easier 
navigation are assigned; 
Based on these criteria the newly proposed taxonomy is well built, meets 
the requirements of structure, comprehensiveness and soundess and exceeds the 
previous approaches by informativeness and organization (ANSI 2010). 
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Table 2.2. Comparison of categorization approaches to the proposed taxonomy 
Characteristic 
Categorization by 
Pearce  
et al. 
(2013) 
NIST 
SP800-
125a 
(Chand
ramouli 
2014) 
SANS 
Insti-
tute 
(Shackl
eford 
2010) 
Gupta 
and 
Kumar 
(2013) 
Hashemi 
and 
Ardakani 
(2012) 
Pro-
posed 
Taxon-
omy 
Number of threats 12 13 19 8 11 34 
Number of 
(sub)categories 
3 6 6 2 1 8 
Depth of subcate-
gorization 
1 1 1 1 1 3 
Average concepts 
per lowest level 
(sub)category 
4.0 2.2 3.2 4.0 11.0 4.3 
 
2.3. Security Controls and Attack Scenarios for the 
Hypervisor Specific Threats 
To ensure proper level of hypervisor security, threats, specified in Fig. 2.2 under 
sub-category “Hypervisor Related” must be covered by at least one security con-
trol. The security controls in this case are considered as means and methods to 
prevent a threat from occurrence, thus meeting a set of predefined security re-
quirements (800-53A: 2014).  
Cloud Security Alliance’s Cloud Control Matrix version 3.0.1 (Cloud 
Security Alliance 2014) is used as a source security controls. The controls, rele-
vant to the proposed threat taxonomy are selected and linked to the threats of the 
proposed taxonomy. The relationships between the threats and security controls 
are provided in Table 2.3. For the convenience of the layout, only the IDs of 
both sources are provided, and the color marking matches the one of the CCM to 
be used as a reference. 
Based on the selection of hypervisor specific security controls, tools and 
methods for realization of each control is selected. It was noticed that multiple 
threats that virtualization faces can be covered by one control mean. Since sim-
ple input without the loss of initial information is an important feature, groups of 
control means, serving as security requirements have been proposed. The re-
quirements for secure hypervisor deployment and management are as follows: 
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Table 2.3. Relationships between CCM security controls (Cloud Security Alliance 2014) 
and proposed taxonomy threats 
CCM 
V3.0.1 Con-
trol ID 
Proposed Taxonomy 
Threat ID 
 
CCM V3.0.1 
Control ID 
Proposed Taxonomy 
Threat ID 
AIS-02 UG1, UG2, UG3  IAM-04 LA3 
AIS-03 
GH1, GH2, GH3, 
GH6, HM2, HC2 
 
IAM-07 UG1 
AIS-04 HC2  IAM-08 GH4, HM3 
AAC-03 LA3, GH6, HM7  IAM-09 UG1 
DCS-01 
HM5, HM6, GH4, 
HC1, HC2 
 
IVS-01 LA2, HM7 
DCS-03 GH3  IVS-02 LA2, HM5 
DCS-04 HC2  IVS-03 GH9 
EKM-01 UG1, UG3, HM1 
 
IVS-07 
GH2, GH5, GH7, 
GH8, HM2, HM4 
EKM-03 HC2, UG1  IVS-09 GH6, GH9, HC2 
EKM-04 UG1, UG2, UG3  IVS-10 GH6, HM7, HM8 
GRM-01 LA3  SEF-02 LA2 
GRM-06 LA3  SEF-04 LA3 
IAM-01 LA1  TVM-01 GH7 
IAM-03 LA2, HM1  TVM-02 GH7 
 
• REQ-1: A Security Policy compliant to existing Information Securi-
ty management standards exists and is operative. This is due to the 
requirements of established baseline security requirements (GRM-
01) and an information security policy (GRM-06), addressing of 
access policies (IAM-04, IAM-07, IAM-09) and customer access 
(AIS-02), as well as policies, ensuring protection of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of data exchanged between the two enti-
ties (AIS-04). Moreover, regulatory compliance has to be main-
tained by defined roles and responsibilities (AAC-03) as well as a 
trust model established (IAM-08). The policy also requires legal 
preparation for incident response (SEF-04). It also requires asset 
classification (DCS-01), equipment identification and inventory 
(DCS-03) as well as authorization prior to relocation or transfer of 
hardware, software or data (DCS-04). 
• REQ-2: Fully established hypervisor technologies are used and 
properly configured. Hypervisors must ensure their competence se-
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curity-wise. Therefore, they must ensure proper encryption and key 
management (EKM-01, EKM-04) as well as the protection of sensi-
tive data (EKM-03). Moreover, established virtualization solutions 
include audit (IAM-01) and diagnostic (IAM-03) capabilities. Hy-
pervisors and the operating systems running on virtual machines in-
side the hypervisor must be hardened, leaving only necessary ports, 
protocols and services open (IVS-07). A hypervisor also must en-
sure that there is no information leakage between the VMs running 
on it (IVS-09) as well as safety and proper level of encryption dur-
ing the migration of VMs due to resource distribution (IVS-10). 
• REQ-3: Fully established provisioning and security solutions are 
used and properly configured. Integrity of data (AIS-03) and 
changes are monitored (IVS-02) as well intrusion detection systems 
are running (IVS-01). The clock is synchronized to facilitate activi-
ty timelines (IVS-03). Incident response and forensic solutions are 
available (SEF-02) as well as solutions for malicious software pre-
vention (TVM-01) and patch management (TVM-02). 
Information security risk analysis procedure is dependent not only on the 
vulnerable objects facing the network, but the nature of the attack as well. The 
nature of the attack depends on the goal of the attacker. Defining the attack leads 
to modeling of various scenarios that an asset may face security-wise.  
A typical way of representing the attack steps is by using attack trees 
(Schneier 1999). While attack tree is a comprehensive tool for complex system 
security evaluation, the inability to represent the interaction between attacks and 
defenses limits the depth of the defense strategy analysis. This leads to inability 
of system security evolution representation using attack trees, as they do not take 
defender’s actions into account. An extension to attack trees – the attack-defense 
trees (ADTrees), proposed by Kordy et al. (2012), adds the ability to represent 
interaction between an attacker and defender thus allowing a comprehensive 
model to be built. 
An attack-defense tree has two types of nodes: attack and defense, which 
represent goals of an attacker and a defender respectively. Such tree also has a 
capability of refinement and countermeasure representation. Each node can have 
one or more children, specifying the sub-goals of the main goal. Each node can 
have one opposite that represents a countermeasure. The refinement can be of 
conjunctive or disjunctive nature, where disjunctively refined node is achieved if 
at least one of its children’s goals is achieved. Conjunctively refined node is 
achieved if all of the children’s goals are achieved. This method allows formal 
representation of attack-defense scenarios that, with proper node weights, can be 
simulated to acquire predictions for real-life situations. The formalization of this 
type of trees requires that attack nodes are represented as circles and defense 
nodes as rectangles. Refinement relations are indicated by solid lines. 
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Formal ADTree analysis is performed by defining the ADTree with an ab-
stract syntax term (ADTerm) that is linked to a signature (AD-signature). An 
AD-signature is defined by an unranked function F with domain D and a range R 
that denotes a family of functions ∈ℕ, where :  → , for k > 0. An 
ADTerm can be of the proponent’s (denoted as ) and opponent’s (denoted as ) type, where the proponent’s type constitute a formal representation of AD-
Trees. An ADTree is considered to be a finite ordered tree T over the set of la-
bels 
 = ⋃⋃∨,∧,∨,∧ and function :  ! → ○, □ with two 
conditions – condition 1 ensures that each node p of an ADTree is either refined 
in a conjunctive or disjunctive way. Condition 2 specifies the requirement that 
each node p may only have one child of the opposite type. And it must be de-
picted as the rightmost child node of p (Kordy et al. 2012). 
The function λ distinguishes between attack and defense nodes. Value λ(ε) 
determines whether the attacker or the defender is the proponent of the tree. 
Comparison of the λ values of the parent node with the values of λ applied to its 
children refined and non-refined nodes are specified. A node p is considered to 
be refined with the condition that it has at least one child pi. A non-refined node 
can have at most one child p1, and this child needs to satisfy $ ≠  $1.  
For this case, the attack and defense surface is modeled as an attack-defense 
tree where the root represents the goal of the attack, while the rest of the nodes 
represent attack steps and defenses to mitigate the risk. As the main goal is con-
sidered to be the control of the hypervisor. The attack-defense tree is designed to 
represent the requirements for secure hypervisor deployment and management, 
specified in subchapter 2.3. 
From the attacker point of view hypervisor security is evaluated by the pos-
sibility to apply certain attack scenarios to gain the desired attack goal. Defining 
attack scenarios enable the definition of the attack goals and modeling the means 
and methods to acquire them. Common hypervisor attack goals, specified by 
(EC-Council 2011) include: 
1. Denial of service (DoS) (ATT_1) – the main aim is to shut down a 
hypervisor or plant a backdoor to access the VMs. The attack for this 
goal is modeled based on the classification of DoS attacks provided 
by (Prasad et al. 2014), extending them with the countermeasures 
provided by (Mirkovic, Reiher 2004). Analysis of this attack scenario 
for the purpose of risk assessment is provided in (Sommestad et al. 
2011). The attack detection defense mechanism in this case covers the 
following requirements presented in subchapter 2.3: 
a) Pattern, anomaly detection – REQ-3, as it involves technical 
provisioning and security solutions, including change moni-
toring and intrusion detection systems; 
b) 3rd party detection – REQ-1, as it involves passing the re-
sponsibilities to a 3rd party supplier that requires legislative 
and governance documentation; 
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2. Jump Virtual machines (VM) (ATT_2) – using a security hole in the 
hypervisor, a user logged into one VM can jump to another VM. VM 
jumping can be achieved due to non-secure (old, obsolete and vulner-
able) OS running on the VMs and/or no separation between traffic be-
tween VMs and external network (Reuben 2007). Although this attack 
scenario may seem to be virtual machine specific, the concerns of hy-
pervisor weaknesses make it a hypervisor attack scenario as well. The 
countermeasures in this case cover the following requirements pre-
sented in subchapter 2.3: 
a) Patching – REQ-3, as it involves malicious software 
prevention and patching itself; 
b) Network segregation – REQ-2, as it is a technical 
operational requirement, including configuration hardening; 
3. Intercept host traffic (ATT_3) – exploiting a vulnerability in the hy-
pervisor to track system calls, paging files, memory, and disk activity. 
Caused by non-hardened configuration which leads to promiscuous 
virtual network adapter mode and disabled switch traffic examination. 
It allows for placing of frames with a forged MAC address to the net-
work, thus changing the destination of the packet from the legal recip-
ient virtual machine to the malicious one (Borza et al. 2004). The re-
sulting attack-defense model includes configuration hardening 
requirement (REQ-2) and traffic monitoring and examination (REQ-3). 
 
 
Fig. 2.4. Attack-defense tree for Denial of Service (source: author) 
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Fig. 2.5. Attack-defense tree for Virtual Machine Jumping (source: author) 
 
Fig. 2.6. Attack-defense tree for Hypervisor Host Traffic Interception (source: author) 
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Expanding them with the relevant ones used by the Operating System con-
cept of Cyber Security Modeling Language (Sommestad et al. 2013) adds the 
following attack goals with predefined attack-defense trees (Holm et al. 2013): 
• Find unknown service (ATT_4) – if the hypervisor is not managed 
based on the least privilege principle, unknown services can be ex-
ploited to gain control over the hypervisor; 
• Find exploit (ATT_5) – involves looking for unknown or unmanaged 
vulnerabilities to gain control over the hypervisor; 
• Execute arbitrary code (ATT_6) – access and privilege management 
issues as well as security holes lead to possibility of injecting and exe-
cuting arbitrary code. Analyzed in (Sommestad et al. 2012); 
• Deploy exploit (ATT_7) – find a security hole and deploy an exploit; 
• Compromise (ATT_8) – intentional or unintentional impact on confi-
dentiality, integrity or availability by an untrusted source. 
2.4. Definition of the Virtualization-security related 
Variables 
The variables, analyzed for this study are based on the attack scenarios of the 
hypervisor. While most of these attack scenarios are analyzed in the previous 
research (Sommestad et al. 2011, 2012; Sommestad 2012) the two new attack 
scenarios dealing with virtual machine jumping (ATT_2) and host traffic inter-
ception (ATT_3) require expert information acquisition. The variables of these 
scenarios are presented in Table 2.4. 
Table 2.4. Variables for hypervisor risk analysis 
Scenario Variable Description and validation 
ATT_2 
SV 
Software vulnerability, allowing the VM jumping (e.g. exploit-
ing memory corruption vulnerabilities (National Vulnerability 
Database 2014), faulty port and virtual device management 
(Kortchinsky 2015)). 
AC 
Access vulnerability enabling the attacker to access the adminis-
trative environment and make changes to the system (e.g. privi-
lege escalation (National Vulnerability Database 2012)).  
CF 
Secure configuration plays an essential role in the overall hy-
pervisor security, as improper configuration of the hypervisor 
can expose it to misusage (Shackleford 2010).  
ATT_3 TI 
Traffic isolation is a very important aspect of hypervisor securi-
ty, as there is a tendency of host traffic interception by guest 
systems on the hypervisor (Oracle 2012). 
VF 
Virtual firewalls prevent any undesired activity within the vir-
tualization environment (Garber 2012). 
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Numerical values for the variables presented in Table 2.4 are required for the 
risk analysis process. These numerical values have to be acquired from a highly 
validated and trusted source.  
Vulnerabilities and their exploitation are on the main focus for the past 
decade, with initial research approaches analysing the vulnerabilities on a large 
scale (Frei et al. 2006). As the topic evolved, associations between the 
exploitability scores and real-life situations have been developed to predict 
future incidents (Bozorgi et al. 2010), along with a deeper approach, specifically 
analysing CVSS exploitability evaluation (Allodi, Massacci 2014). The 
overview of the existing information security vulnerability datasets is presented 
in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.5. Existing vulnerability and exploit databases 
No. Name Size Description 
1. NVD 74 100 
entries 
National Vulnerability Database. Contains all dis-
closed vulnerabilities (CVE – Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exploits (International 
Telecommunication Union 2012)) and respective 
CVSS assessment. Maintained by US Govern-
mental institutions: NIST, DHS, NCCIC and US-
CERT. High validity and reliability. 
2. EDB 35 220 
entries 
The Exploit Database is a CVE compliant ar-
chive of public exploits and corresponding vul-
nerable software. Contains reports of the vulner-
abilities for which a “proof-of-concept” exploit 
exists. Maintaned by private company – Offen-
sive Security. 
3. EKITS 216 en-
tries 
Specifies exploit kits and market service prices in 
the black market (Allodi, Massacci 2012). 
4. Symantec Se-
curity Re-
sponse threat 
writeups 
1 125 
entries 
Contains the exploits for the computer operating 
systems that run Symantec security products. 
Types of exploits are: virus, worm, macro, mis-
leading application, potentially unwanted app, 
parental control, adware trojan, dialer adware, 
adware, removal information, hoax, spyware and 
security assessment tool trojan. Source validated 
and reliable. 
5. 0day.today 24 707 
entries 
Collects exploits from submittals and various 
mailing lists and concentrates them in a database. 
Source not validated. 
6. Rapid7 Vulner-
ability and Ex-
ploit Database 
69 092 
entries 
Replicates the CVEs from the NVD. 
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The Table 2.5 entries No. 5 and 6 are excluded from the analysis due to the 
lack of validity of No. 5 and the replicative nature of No. 6. The mapping of the 
rest of the provided dataset coverage, created by (Allodi, Massacci 2012) is pre-
sented in Fig. 2.7, where the numbers match the “No.” column of Table 2.5. The 
colors red, orange and cyan represent high, medium and low score vulnerabili-
ties respectively. It is worth noticing that the amount vulnerabilities in the cate-
gories of low and medium in the NVD dataset is disproportionally high with re-
spect to the others. 
 
Fig. 2.7. Relative map of vulnerabilities per dataset: 1 – NVD; 2 – EDB; 3 – EKITS; 4 – 
Symantec; 5 – 0day.today; 6 – Rapid7 (Allodi, Massacci 2012) 
The analysis of the informativeness of datasets has shown, that the NVD 
dataset includes the rest of the analyzed datasets (Allodi, Massacci 2012), there-
fore only the NVD is used as the primary dataset for the scoring. 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) managed by National 
Institute of Standards and Technology and FIRST provides a robust scoring sys-
tem for IT vulnerabilities with input from representatives of a broad range of 
industry sectors, from banking and finance to technology and academia. It runs 
incorporated to the National Vulnerability Database which is the U.S. govern-
ment repository of standards based vulnerability management data. The CVSS 
scores are considered to be the de facto standard for risk measurement (Allodi, 
Massacci 2012). Usage of CVSS scores for definition and assessment of quanti-
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tative security risk measures has been introduced by Joh and Malaiya (Joh, 
Malaiya 2011). 
The system contains vulnerability scores of three categories provided in 
decimal scoring scale: Base scores, Temporal and Environmental. The interest 
of this study is for the Exploitability score found under the Base scores category. 
The exploitability score is an empirical metric, evaluating: attack complexity 
(C_AC), privileges required (C_PR), attack vector (C_AV) and user interaction 
(C_UI) parameters. This metric reflect the ease and technical means by which 
the vulnerability can be exploited. The attack complexity metric describes the 
conditions beyond the attacker’s control that must exist in order to exploit the 
vulnerability. These conditions may require the collection of more information 
about the target, the presence of certain system configuration settings, or compu-
tational exceptions. The privileges required metric describes the level of privi-
leges an attacker must acquire before the exploitation of the vulnerability. This 
metric if greatest if no privileges are required. The attack vector metric reflects 
the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. The user interaction 
metric represents the requirement for a user, other than the attacker, to partici-
pate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable component. This metric de-
termines if the vulnerability can be exploited by only an attacker, or a separate 
user must participate in some manner (FIRST 2014). The method (FIRST 2014) 
suggests that the Exploitability score is calculated as follows and presented in 
(2.1): 
 ()** = 8.22 ∙ ∏ /012 , (2.1) 
where the parameter values C and their associations to the indexes k are present-
ed in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6. CVSS v. 3.0 Variable metric value association to numerical values  
(FIRST 2014) 
Index k parameter Metric Value Numerical Value 
AV 1 
Network 
Adjacent Network 
Local 
Physical 
0.85 
0.62 
0.55 
0.20 
PR 2 
None 
Low  
High 
0.85 
0.62 
0.27 
AC 3 
Low 
High 
0.77 
0.44 
UI 4 
None 
Required 
0.85 
0.62 
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The score of the hypervisor risk analysis variables is defined by extracting 
the related vulnerability Exploitability scores from the CVSS. The sample set for 
each of the variables is set based on the sample size requirements of (Bartlett 
et al. 2001). The requirements specify that appropriate sample size is one of four 
features of a study design that have influence on detection of significant differ-
ences, relations or interactions. This means that appropriate sample size mini-
mizes the alpha error (finding a difference that actually does not exist in the 
population) and beta error (failing to find an actual difference in the popula-
tion). Therefore the magnitude of the alpha error is opposite to confidence level. 
The sample size is calculated using Cochran’s sample size formula for continu-
ous data (Bartlett et al. 2001): 
 3 = 45∙6575 , (2.2) 
where t is value for selected alpha level in each tail of the curve, s is the estimate 
of standard deviation in the population and d is acceptable margin of error. The 
standard deviation s calculated based on (Bartlett et al. 2001) is: 
  = 8 29:2 ∑ <= − <̅@9=12 , (2.3) 
where xi is value of each member of the set and <̅ is the mean of the set. 
Given the confidence level is 0.95, and therefore the alpha error 0.05, the 
value of t is set to 1.96 based on (Bartlett et al. 2001), continuous data margin 
error is .03 multiplied by the number of points on primary scale, which, based on 
the CVSS method (FIRST 2014) is 10. The calculations result in standard devia-
tion s = 2.128365 and the sample size n(o) = 19.33579 ≈ 20 for each variable, spec-
ified in Table 2.4. 
The overall population of the set in this study is within the CVSS entry ex-
ploitability scores of the three most recent years associated with virtualization 
technologies. 
Additional study of exploitability score distribution over time from 2013 to 
2015 has shown that the average exploitability score of discovered vulnerabili-
ties has a trend to increase over time (Fig. 2.8). 
To determine the procedures of usage of the CVSS data, the normality of 
the sample data is determined by performing two tests – D’Agostino skewness 
and Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis interpretation (Ghasemi, Zahediasl 2012), and 
statistical normality testing using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for datasets with the 
size of 50 and more and Shapiro-Wilk test if datasets are smaller (Devore 2012). 
The D’Agostino skewness test (1970) and kurtosis (Anscombe, Glynn 
1983) are measures of fit of departure from normality defining whether or not 
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the given sample comes from a normally distributed population. A perfectly 
normal distribution should return a score of 0. Positive value indicates positive 
skew or kurtosis and negative value indicates the negative. The higher the abso-
lute value, the greater the skew or kurtosis. 
 
 
Fig. 2.8. Average CVSS exploitability score distribution over 2013–2015 (source: author) 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Razali, Wah 2011) statistic quantifies a dis-
tance between the empirical distribution function of the sample and the cumula-
tive distribution function of the reference distribution, or between the empirical 
distribution functions of two samples. However, for datasets with less than 50 
elements the Shapiro-Wilk test is used. It utilizes the null hypothesis principle to 
check whether a sample came from a normally distributed population (Devore 
2012). 
Mutually exclusive and exhaustive events are described using the Bayes’ 
Law of Total Probability is applied to define the variable scores, expressed as 
probabilities of occurrence. The Law of Total Probability is expressed as 
(Devore 2012): 
 A = ∑ A|C= ∙ C==12 ,  (2.4) 
where the Total probability P(B) is the sum of conditional probabilities of the 
occurrence of individual events P(B|Ai) multiplied by the prior probabilities 
P(Ai) where the prior probabilities of all events are considered to be equal. 
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2.5. Expertise acquisition and processing 
To prove that information security risk occurrence probabilities can be evaluated 
from processed vulnerability exploitation scoring of validated sources is true, 
expert data is used for comparison. The expert data, required for the risk analysis 
is acquired based on the attack scenarios). This approach is of an empirical na-
ture, when evaluations of multiple human-experts are synthesized to deliver a 
unanimous metric. Each of the attack scenario has a different attack goal, and 
depending on the goals specific data, expressed as probabilities is collected. 
Some of the attack goals, as Denial of Service (Sommestad et al. 2011) and arbi-
trary code execution (Sommestad et al. 2012) are thoroughly covered and de-
scribed in detail, while the newly introduced ones – such as VM Jumping and 
host traffic interception require an additional study. The rest of the attack scenar-
ios are implemented to CySeMoL, therefore they are reused for this study 
(Sommestad et al. 2013). 
Collection of the expert data is performed based on the method introduced 
in (Sommestad et al. 2011) and extensively described in (Holm et al. 2014). The 
method suggests that at first the variables that have an impact on the situation 
have to be defined for the study. These variables are factors that play an im-
portant role in the performance and safety of the assessed component. They are 
used as the basis for modeling the questions to acquire expertise.  
A study on risk assessment probability combinations provides a method for 
combining varying risk assessment results as well as supports the need of multi-
ple experts by concluding that uncertain quantities are better assessed by groups 
rather than a single expert (Clemen, Winkler 1999). This research uses the 
Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991) to combine the risk assessment data, as it 
significantly outperforms the other methods (Cooke 2008).  
The Cooke’s classical model (Cooke 1991) builds a weighted expert proba-
bility assessment combination based on the proper scoring rule theory, where 
good calibration and low entropy are the main factors. This model elicits quan-
tiles from the experts’ distributions. 
These scores are calculated based on the experts’ answers to the specific 
seed questions. A seed question is a specific type of question, for which the cor-
rect answer is known at the time of analysis and is used for evaluation of the 
experts’ knowledge.  
The calibration score shows the deviation of the respondent’s evaluation 
scores from the true values of the known seed questions. These questions require 
the respondents to specify a probability distribution to describe an uncertain con-
tinuous variable that is divided into a number of ranges. For this calibration it is 
divided into four ranges with the dividers being 5th, 50th and 95th quantile values 
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based on (Cooke 2008). Let s = s1, …, sn be a probability distribution and assum-
ing pi > 0, i = [1; 4]; then the relative information of s with respect to p is 
(Cooke 1991): 
 D , $ = ∑ E3 6FF0=12 . (2.5) 
I(s, p) is an index of the information learned if it was believed that p was 
correct, but subsequently learnt that s is correct. 
A set of experts e = 1, …, E assesses probabilities of each uncertain event. 
They assign the corresponding indicator functions to one of B probability bins 
that are associated with a distribution over the possible outcomes. These bins are 
described by the probability pb of occurrence, in the range of [0; 1], b = 1, …, B.  
Based on the observed values and the assignments, weights we are deter-
mined for each expert. The weights have to satisfy the following: we ≥ 0 and 
∑we = 1. The weight we is defined for each expert individually.  
Let nb be a number of variables assigned to b, sb – the sample distribution of 
variables in bin b and N – sum of the variables nb and H(pb) – the probability 
vector. Then the average response entropy is: 
GH3 = 2I ∑ 3J G$J. (2.6) 
The calibration score is: 
/K = 1 − LM@N∑ 23JD J , $JO. (2.7) 
If the expert sample distribution realizations are drawn independently from 
a distribution with quantiles as stated by the expert, then the likelihood ratio sta-
tistic 2NI(s, p) is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variable with 3 de-
grees of freedom (Cooke 2008). Then (2.7) becomes: 
/K =  1 − LP@Q2RD , $S. (2.8) 
As opposed to the entropy, the information score is the second variable for 
the scoring. In a distribution, the information is the distribution concentration 
degree. Concentration or dis-concentration is measured relative to some other 
distribution. The information is expressed as: 
DH3 = 2I ∑ D=I=12 . (2.9) 
Expert assessment combination is called a decision maker. A “good exper-
tise” is considered to have good calibration and good information. Weights are 
associated to reward the “good expertise” in the process of decision making.  
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If the expert calibration score is above the set threshold, the weight of the 
expert e is the multiplication of calibration and information scores: 
TUK = /K ⋅ DH3.  (2.10) 
Otherwise, the weight is set to zero. The threshold is set at the optimal posi-
tion that is described as the highest possible weight of a virtual expert 
(Sommestad et al. 2011).  
The seed questions are required to be very well validated and fall for the 
same domain of which the unknown variables are. These seed questions serve 
as an expert performance evaluation mechanism leading to weighting the im-
portance of individual expert’s opinion to the whole dataset. It is important to 
introduce these questions to the whole evaluation as seamless as possible for 
the expert to be able to identify them (Cooke 1991). The robustness of the 
weighting is highly dependable on the number of seeds used. Based on 
(Cooke 1991) eleven questions is enough to recognize substantial difference 
in calibration. These questions include both – the vulnerabilities to the hyper-
visor with known characteristics as well as the ones that the values are to be 
determined. The known answer values of known questions are taken from the 
National Vulnerability Database (NIST 2015) managed by the US Department 
of Commerce (questions 1–5), ENISA Threat Landscape (Marinos 2014) 
(question 6), Alert Logic Cloud Security Report (Coty et al. 2014) (questions 
7–8), Bitglass Cloud Security Spotlight Report (Bitglass 2015) (questions 9–
10) and 2nd Watch AWS Scorecard January – March 2015 (2nd Watch 2015) 
(question 11). 
To retrieve the values of unknown variables, a survey is built for the in-
teraction with the experts. Based on the requirements, specified in this chap-
ter and the variables which vales need to be retrieved, specified in subchapter 
2.4 a survey containing seed questions is built. The seed question of the sur-
vey are presented in Table 2.7. The questions for variable evaluation are pre-
sented in Table 2.8. 
The unknown probabilities of the risk variables are acquired from the ex-
pert questions a.–e. of Table 2.8. The quality of expert knowledge is to be ex-
pressed by the weights that are to be assigned to the experts depending on their 
knowledge. The quality of knowledge is assessed using the Cooke’s expert 
elicitation method and the expert input correlation to the known facts in Table 
2.7. 
To collect the required information – a set of experts of the domain is se-
lected and their expertise acquired. 
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Table 2.7. Seed questions of the survey for hypervisor security expertise acquisition 
No. Question Value, % 
1. 
What is the share of known vulnerabilities with some impact 
on virtualization technologies? 
3 
2. 
Of the known vulnerabilities with some impact on virtualiza-
tion technologies, what is the portion that is hypervisor related? 
73 
3. 
Of the known hypervisor related vulnerabilities what is the 
average severity? 
52 
4. 
Of the known hypervisor related vulnerabilities what is the 
highest recorded severity? 
93 
5. 
What is the share of known vulnerabilities with some impact 
on virtualization technologies that have affect VMware prod-
ucts? 
52 
6. 
What is the average growth of bandwidth of DDoS attacks be-
tween years 2013 and 2014? 
70 
7. 
What is current public IT Cloud Computing annual growth 
rate? 
24 
8. 
What is the share of the overall incidents of the Cloud Hosting 
Providers to web application attacks? 
44 
9. 
What is the share of increase of the security effectiveness that 
security training and awareness increases? 
45 
10. What portion of the data, stored in the Cloud is email? 45 
11. 
What is the share of Linux-based cloud servers to overall num-
ber for Amazon Web Services? 
24 
Table 2.8. Questions for expertise variable evaluation 
a. What is the probability of hypervisor exploitation using software vulnera-
bilities? 
b. What is the probability of hypervisor exploitation using access vulnera-
bilities? 
c. What is the probability of hypervisor exploitation due to insecure config-
uration? 
d. What is the probability of hypervisor exploitation due to traffic isolation 
issues? 
e. What is the probability of hypervisor exploitation due to lack of virtual 
firewalls? 
  
The experts for this study have been selected based on their publications in 
the field of virtualization security. Therefore, authors with publications within 
2010 and 2015 that have keywords of virtualization, hypervisor and virtual 
machine monitor and are included in Thomson Web of Knowledge, SCOPUS 
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and INSPEC databases have been selected as experts. Of those, the ones with 
public contact information have been included to the list, which resulted in 638 
entries. 117 of these entries turned out to be outdated, therefore they were 
discarded from the list. The rest of the experts have been invited to participate in 
the study. 31 of 521 responded to the call. Based on the results of (Ryan et al. 
2012) and (Cooke 2008) this number of experts is sufficient to achieve 
consistent results. 
2.6. Conclusions of Second Chapter 
1. A taxonomy, combining all the threats found in the threat landscapes was 
proposed. Additionally, four threats are expanded in this taxonomy to pro-
vide a more detailed picture. As the three main analyzed sources differ by 
the application field (technical (Pearce et al. 2013), hypervisor deployment 
and governance (Chandramouli 2014) and commercial product deployment 
(Shackleford 2010)), the proposed taxonomy represents a complete virtual-
ization threat landscape.  
2. The comparison of the previous categorization approaches to the newly pro-
posed taxonomy is evaluated based on the National Information Standards 
Organization standard ANSI/NISO Z39.19 and the main requirements of: 
a) structure: hierarchical classification of information – this is represented 
by the number of (sub)categories. The proposed taxonomy that has 8 ex-
ceeds the nearest approach by two (sub)categories additionally provid-
ing three levels of subcategorization for easier implementation; 
b) comprehensiveness: the taxonomy should cover the objective domain – 
the number of nodes in the proposed taxonomy – 34 exceeds the nearest 
approach by fifteen entries; 
c) soundness: the taxonomy should meet the standard requirements – the 
number of narrower terms for a broader term falls into the recommended 
range of [3; 20], the identifiers for each node for easier navigation are 
assigned. 
3. To simplify the input of risk analysis without the loss of initial information, 
three groups of control means for secure hypervisor deployment and man-
agement, serving as security requirements have been proposed.  
4. A survey is built to acquire the expert evaluation on the variables, required 
for this study. The unknown probabilities of the risk variables are acquired 
from the expert questions a.–e. of Table 2.7. The quality of expert 
knowledge is to be expressed by the weights that are to be assigned to the 
experts depending on their knowledge. The quality of knowledge is assessed 
using the Cooke’s expert elicitation method and the expert input correlation 
to the known facts. 
 51 
3 
Application of the Virtualization Risk 
Analysis to CySeMoL 
Combining the information, presented in chapter 1 with the existing CySeMoL 
capabilities leads to an introduction of a new – Hypervisor meta-class to the 
CySeMoL meta-model for the automated information security risk analysis. The 
implementation of information presented in chapter 2 is achieved by performing 
analysis of:  
1. Risk of occurrence of hypervisor specific threats, provided in Fig. 2.2 
serves as the cornerstone for this risk analysis as it defines the existing 
sources for the risks. 
2. Specific controls for threat impact mitigation, presented in Table 2.3 
provide detailed means and methods to cover the existing threats and 
therefore minimize the risk. 
3. General requirements for hypervisor security assurance, provided in 
subchapter 2.3 is a generalized approach to represent the data as re-
quirements to ensure the security of the hypervisor. 
4. Hypervisor attack scenarios incorporate the data of the first three as-
pects, supported by external technical documentation to provide the 
attack steps and countermeasures, required for traceable analysis of 
component risk. 
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The results of experiments, presented in this chapter are published in 
two papers (Janulevicius et al. 2016a, Janulevicius et al. 2016b). Subchapter 
3.4.1 summarizes the publication with co-authors: Extension of CYSEMOL 
for cloud computing information security assessment; subchapter 3.4.2 
summarizes the publication with co-authors: Content based model 
transformations: solutions to existing issues with application in information 
security. 
3.1. Experimental variable evaluation  
The required variable evaluation is performed by using two data sources – the 
CVSS scores obtained from the CVE database and the expert evaluations. The 
results of the two approaches are compared to draw conclusions regarding the 
possibility of substitution between the two sources.  
To provide the data of hypervisor risk analysis variable scores (Table 3.1), a 
sample of 20 CVSS exploitability scores, of the common vulnerabilities and 
exposures (CVE), related to each variable are analyzed as described in sub-
chapter 2.4.  
Table 3.1. Score analysis for hypervisor analysis variables 
Var. CVE code Exploit. score  Var. CVE code Exploit. score 
SV CVE-2014-8891 
CVE-2015-3629 
CVE-2013-5878 
CVE-2014-0428 
CVE-2014-0422 
CVE-2014-0416 
CVE-2014-0373 
CVE-2014-0368 
CVE-2013-5893 
CVE-2013-3515 
10.0 
3.9 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
8.6 
3.9 
 SV CVE-2014-8867 
CVE-2014-8866 
CVE-2015-5166 
CVE-2015-4106 
CVE-2015-2152 
CVE-2015-2044 
CVE-2014-4947 
CVE-2013-4361 
CVE-2013-4355 
CVE-2015-3456 
3.9 
3.4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.4 
3.9 
10.0 
3.9 
2.7 
5.1 
AC CVE-2013-2212 
CVE-2014-4632 
CVE-2014-8750 
CVE-2013-1211 
CVE-2013-3079 
CVE-2012-1833 
CVE-2014-1211 
CVE-2013-3107 
CVE-2013-1405 
CVE-2015-0259 
5.5 
8.6 
8.0 
10.0 
8.0 
10.0 
8.6 
8.6 
10.0 
4.9 
 AC CVE-2013-6470 
CVE-2013-4471 
CVE-2014-2828 
CVE-2014-1948 
CVE-2013-2157 
CVE-2013-2059 
CVE-2013-0282 
CVE-2015-1950 
CVE-2012-4116 
CVE-2013-1186 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
1.9 
8.6 
6.8 
10.0 
3.9 
8.6 
10.0 
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The end of the Table 3.1 
Var. CVE code Exploitability  
score 
 Var. CVE code Exploitability 
score 
CF CVE-2014-8370 
CVE-2015-3259 
CVE-2015-2152 
CVE-2013-4369 
CVE-2015-3646 
CVE-2015-1852 
CVE-2014-3703 
CVE-2014-7821 
CVE-2014-3632 
CVE-2011-4347 
10.0 
3.1 
3.4 
3.4 
8.0 
8.6 
10.0 
8.0 
4.9 
1.9 
 CF CVE-2014-7144 
CVE-2014-3621 
CVE-2014-5356 
CVE-2013-1068 
CVE-2013-6470 
CVE-2013-6433 
CVE-2013-0266 
CVE-2015-2682 
CVE-2014-0201 
CVE-2014-0200 
8.6 
8.0 
8.0 
10.0 
10.0 
4.9 
3.9 
10.0 
3.9 
3.9 
TI 
CVE-2014-1207 
CVE-2013-5970 
CVE-2014-0852 
CVE-2014-3477 
CVE-2014-0984 
CVE-2014-0076 
CVE-2014-0006 
CVE-2013-4576 
CVE-2013-5915 
CVE-2013-4242 
8.6 
8.6 
8.6 
3.9 
8.6 
8.6 
8.6 
3.9 
8.6 
3.9 
 TI 
CVE-2013-4165 
CVE-2013-1624 
CVE-2013-1623 
CVE-2013-1620 
CVE-2013-1619 
CVE-2013-1618 
CVE-2013-0169 
CVE-2013-6398 
CVE-2013-5566 
CVE-2015-0695 
8.6 
4.9 
8.6 
8.6 
4.9 
4.9 
4.9 
5.5 
10.0 
10.0 
VF 
CVE-2013-6398 
CVE-2013-5566 
CVE-2015-2841 
CVE-2014-3703 
CVE-2014-3555 
CVE-2015-4769 
CVE-2015-4767 
CVE-2015-2639 
CVE-2015-0593 
CVE-2015-0592 
5.5 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
8.0 
6.8 
3.2 
6.8 
8.6 
10.0 
 VF 
CVE-2014-6383 
CVE-2014-6242 
CVE-2014-5350 
CVE-2014-4746 
CVE-2014-2519 
CVE-2014-3857 
CVE-2014-3813 
CVE-2013-7182 
CVE-2013-5092 
CVE-2014-0655 
10.0 
8.0 
10.0 
10.0 
8.6 
8.0 
10.0 
8.6 
8.6 
8.6 
 
Further investigation of the variables includes analysis and graphical 
representation of variable distribution for the defined variables, presented in 
Figs. 3.1–3.5. 
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Fig. 3.1. Distribution histogram of the SV variable (source: author) 
Variable SV has these characteristics: mean of μSV = 6.53, standard devi-
ation δSV = 3.12, skewness γSV = 0.19, kurtosis κSV = (–2.08). The Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality returns the value of WSV = 0. 
From the graphical variable distribution inspection using Fig. 3.1 it is 
assumed that the normality of the distribution is false. Skewness and kurtosis 
characteristics, however, deny this assumption, as skewness and kurtosis of 
variable SV distribution falls in the range of [–1;1] which typically indicates 
whether the distribution can be considered normal (Devore 2012). 
The null hypothesis (Shapiro-Wilk test) for the test of normality claims 
that the distribution of the variable is equal to the expected normal distribu-
tion, but due to the fact that the probability associated with the test of nor-
mality, less than 0, is less than or equal to the level of significance (0.01), the 
null hypothesis is rejected as non-descriptive. Therefore, it is concluded that 
the SV variable is not normally distributed. 
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Fig. 3.2. Distribution histogram of the AC variable (source: author) 
Variable AC has these characteristics: mean of μAC = 8.10, standard de-
viation δAC = 2.35, skewness γAC = (–1.40), kurtosis κAC = 1.31. The Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality returns the value of WAC = 0.001. 
From the graphical variable distribution inspection using Fig. 3.2 it is 
assumed that the normality of the distribution is false. Skewness and kurtosis 
characteristics support this assumption, as these characteristics are outside of 
the range of [–1;1]; 
The null hypothesis (Shapiro-Wilk test) for the test of normality claims 
that the distribution of the variable is equal to the expected normal distribu-
tion, but due to the fact that the probability associated with the test of nor-
mality, less than 0.001, is less than or equal to the level of significance 
(0.01), the null hypothesis is rejected as non-descriptive. Therefore, it is con-
cluded that the AC variable is not normally distributed. 
 
56 3. APPLICATION OF THE VIRTUALIZATION RISK ANALYSIS TO CYSEMOL 
 
 
Fig. 3.3. Distribution histogram of the CF variable (source: author) 
Variable CF has these characteristics: mean of μCF = 6.63, standard devia-
tion δCF = 2.87, skewness γCF = (–0.17), kurtosis κCF = –(1.67). The Shapiro-
Wilk test of normality returns the value of WCF = 0.001. 
From the graphical variable distribution inspection using Fig. 3.3 it is as-
sumed that the normality of the distribution is false. Skewness opposes and kur-
tosis characteristic supports this assumption. 
The null hypothesis (Shapiro-Wilk test) for the test of normality claims that 
the distribution of the variable is equal to the expected normal distribution, but 
due to the fact that the probability associated with the test of normality, less than 
0.001, is less than or equal to the level of significance (0.01), the null hypothesis 
is rejected as non-descriptive. Therefore, it is concluded that the CF variable is 
not normally distributed. 
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Fig. 3.4. Distribution histogram of the TI variable (source: author) 
Variable TI has these characteristics: mean of μTI = 7.14, standard deviation 
δTI = 2.20, skewness γTI = (–0.40), kurtosis κCF = –(1.63). The Shapiro-Wilk test 
of normality returns the value of WTI = 0.001. 
From the graphical variable distribution inspection using Fig. 3.4 it is as-
sumed that the normality of the distribution is false. Skewness and kurtosis char-
acteristics support this assumption. 
The null hypothesis (Shapiro-Wilk test) for the test of normality claims that 
the distribution of the variable is equal to the expected normal distribution, but 
due to the fact that the probability associated with the test of normality, less than 
0.001, is less than or equal to the level of significance (0.01), the null hypothesis 
is rejected as non-descriptive. Therefore, it is concluded that the TI variable is 
not normally distributed. 
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Fig. 3.5. Distribution histogram of the VF variable (source: author) 
Variable VF has these characteristics: mean of μVF = 8.47, standard deviation 
δVF0 = 1.80, skewness γVF = (–1.53), kurtosis κCF = 2.68. The Shapiro-Wilk test 
of normality returns the value of WTI = 0.009. 
From the graphical variable distribution inspection using Fig. 3.5 it is 
assumed that the normality of the distribution is false. Skewness and kurtosis 
characteristics support this assumption. 
The null hypothesis (Shapiro-Wilk test) for the normality test claims that the 
variable distribution is equal to the expected normal distribution, but due to the fact 
that the probability associated with the test of normality, less than 0.001, is less than 
or equal to the level of significance (0.01), the null hypothesis is rejected as non-
descriptive. Therefore, it is concluded that the VF variable is not normally distributed. 
Since the normality of the score datasets is proven to be false, the Bayes’ Law 
of Total Probability is not considered to be descriptive for such datasets. For such 
datasets a robust estimator that is less affected by the non-normality of the distribu-
tion is required. For this reason a statistical measure of central tendency – the winso-
rized mean – is used (Fuller 1991), with 10% of the extreme values winsorized. 
These values are used as the metrics of the variable. The observed variable scores 
are normalized by converting from decimal to centennial system to match with the 
output of other method’s data for comparison. The scores are presented in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.2. Variable scores (95% reliability) 
Variable SV AC CF TI VF 
Upper_bound, % 80.47 93.00 80.81 82.09 95.18 
Variable_score, %  (Winso-
rized_mean_10%) 65.60 82.00 66.00 71.00 85.00 
Lower_bound, % 51.23 71.00 53.99 61.51 78.32 
Uncertainty, % 14.37 11.00 13.16 9.89 8.78 
 
To acquire the expert assessment on the topic, a set of 31 experts, has been 
presented with the questions, provided in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. The assessment 
results of each expert are provided in Table 3.3. In this table, experts are identi-
fied by providing an identification code, consisting of the letter E and the se-
quence number. The cell values are the expert assigned probabilities for the oc-
currence of the previously expressed phenomena. 
Table 3.3. Expert assessment of the seed and the hypervisor security variable  
probabilities (%) 
 Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a b c d e 
E1 10 65 75 100 60 55 40 50 40 50 30 60 70 70 80 70 
E2 5 70 50 99 50 80 40 40 60 45 25 60 60 60 60 60 
E3 8 70 20 90 35 40 20 30 30 60 50 50 70 60 65 50 
E4 1 80 45 95 47 53 25 45 51 41 30 51 87 60 70 80 
E5 10 60 36 99 55 65 30 42 55 33 20 70 80 65 69 55 
E6 15 70 45 100 40 76 15 55 58 49 25 62 75 65 65 57 
E7 4 75 50 90 48 70 25 45 50 45 25 67 80 68 70 80 
E8 25 80 70 92 50 75 13 60 42 50 33 65 77 70 70 55 
E9 56 40 80 70 20 25 60 50 20 70 50 90 50 80 30 40 
E10 13 66 40 93 40 50 30 44 50 65 25 75 75 70 70 60 
E11 9 50 45 99 65 35 22 40 40 60 25 70 75 60 70 50 
 
60 3. APPLICATION OF THE VIRTUALIZATION RISK ANALYSIS TO CYSEMOL 
 
The end of the Table 3.3 
 Question 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 a b c d e 
E12 5 75 45 85 50 65 25 50 45 40 24 67 76 67 67 56 
E13 40 40 80 85 10 10 45 70 30 50 45 50 50 60 60 50 
E14 4 70 37 95 50 77 18 33 36 39 25 62 78 60 70 65 
E15 3 72 55 95 50 70 20 40 45 40 20 65 85 65 72 80 
E16 5 65 50 80 40 50 35 35 50 50 25 50 60 70 60 50 
E17 10 75 45 97 45 55 30 40 50 50 24 60 70 60 70 60 
E18 7 70 50 100 35 59 15 50 55 40 25 75 75 50 50 50 
E19 1 72 50 99 50 50 20 49 50 33 25 45 50 45 60 80 
E20 60 50 25 80 70 30 43 15 43 70 45 55 80 65 70 60 
E21 10 76 57 90 50 65 21 50 50 45 24 60 65 50 70 60 
E22 9 70 60 98 45 65 24 50 50 49 24 65 60 65 60 55 
E23 5 75 50 90 50 70 25 45 40 40 25 65 80 65 70 85 
E24 5 66 70 91 44 50 27 55 45 40 20 60 60 70 50 95 
E25 2 67 67 95 51 47 30 47 50 45 24 40 65 75 70 50 
E26 5 72 40 95 43 52 33 40 50 50 25 60 65 60 60 55 
E27 10 70 45 95 48 70 25 40 55 55 24 60 80 70 70 60 
E28 5 65 39 99 50 66 17 49 50 40 25 60 70 80 80 45 
E29 2 70 40 98 49 70 21 35 50 45 25 50 70 65 65 60 
E30 3 66 50 100 50 67 24 40 45 45 24 35 65 75 70 60 
E31 2 71 50 97 50 56 20 45 40 35 25 50 80 70 65 55 
The assessments of the experts are weighted to define the importance of 
each of their assessment using the Cooke’s classical method. Based on the 
method three main metrics are acquired – the calibration score, mean relative 
total and the weight of an expert. The weights are then normalized, so that the 
sum of the weights equals 1. The results of these calculations are presented in 
Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4. Weights of expert assessments 
Id Calibration 
Mean relative 
total 
Unnormalized 
weight 
Normalized 
weight we 
E1 0.37000 0.120 0.046 0.150 
E2 0.20000 0.240 0.048 0.150 
E3 0.20000 0.130 0.026 0.082 
E4 0.01200 0.290 0.000 0.000 
E5 0.20000 0.100 0.021 0.067 
E6 0.20000 0.130 0.027 0.086 
E7 0.01200 0.300 0.000 0.000 
E8 0.39000 0.120 0.046 0.150 
E9 0.15000 0.170 0.000 0.000 
E10 0.01200 0.190 0.000 0.000 
E11 0.20000 0.100 0.020 0.065 
E12 0.01200 0.210 0.000 0.000 
E13 0.15000 0.200 0.000 0.000 
E14 0.01200 0.230 0.000 0.000 
E15 0.00054 0.250 0.000 0.000 
E16 0.06800 0.190 0.000 0.000 
E17 0.06800 0.110 0.000 0.000 
E18 0.06800 0.220 0.000 0.000 
E19 0.00054 0.280 0.000 0.000 
E20 0.39000 0.140 0.053 0.174 
E21 0.01200 0.120 0.000 0.000 
E22 0.01200 0.140 0.000 0.000 
E23 0.01200 0.210 0.000 0.000 
E24 0.01200 0.210 0.000 0.000 
E25 0.06800 0.280 0.000 0.000 
E26 0.06800 0.210 0.000 0.000 
E27 0.20000 0.120 0.023 0.076 
E28 0.01200 0.220 0.000 0.000 
E29 0.00054 0.260 0.000 0.000 
E30 0.00054 0.250 0.000 0.000 
E31 0.00054 0.230 0.000 0.000 
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Based on the normalized expert weights and their assessment of each varia-
ble, the value of the variables is evaluated as a sum of multiplications of the two 
values. Therefore, the evaluation is performed using: 
∑ TW= ∙ XW=9=12 , (3.1) 
where wEi is the weight of expert i, and VEi is the value assigned to the variable 
by the same expert.  
Using the previously described statistical procedures, individual variable 
scores have been obtained from the provided expertise. Moreover, the 
magnitude of uncertainty has been defined. Based on this magnitude, it is 
assumed that the variable falls within the range, defined by the upper and 
lower bounds with a confidence level of 95%. The detailed results of the 
variable evaluation and distribution using expert knowledge are presented in 
Table 3.5. 
Table 3.5. Variable evaluation using expert knowledge 
Variable SVe ACe CFe TIe VFe 
Upper_bound, % 63.83 74.12 67.91 68.88 65.6 
Variable_score, %  59.81 70.42 65.00 65.42 60.90 
Lower_bound, % 55.78 66.71 62.09 61.96 56.20 
Uncertainty, % 4.02 3.70 2.91 3.46 9.40 
3.2. Comparison of the Results 
To check if the CVSS scores can be substituted with the expert evaluation and 
vice-versa, a statistical procedure to measure the equivalence between the two 
datasets is carried out.  
As a primary characteristic, a correlation test of the two datasets is per-
formed. The correlation plot is presented in Fig. 3.6 The returned correlation 
coefficient value of r = 0.0849 suggests that the correlations is weak. How-
ever, visual inspection of the plot suggests that only the variable VF is 
strongly deviated from the tendencies. Therefore, disregarding this variable 
in the correlation analysis returns r = 0.8964 correlation coefficient, which 
shows a very strong relation between the two datasets. However, correlation 
only shows the similarity of pattern, leaving other important parameters, 
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such as magnitude out of scope. Therefore, a more detailed investigation is 
carried out. 
 
Fig. 3.6. Correlation of Expert evaluation and CVE scores (source: author) 
Further investigation of the score equivalence is performed by using the 
Kruskal-Wallis H test, due to the variable data being non-normally distribut-
ed (Corder, Foreman 2009). It is a rank-based nonparametric test used to de-
termine if there are statistically significant differences between two or more 
groups of an independent variable on a continuous or ordinal dependent vari-
able. The test provides the χ2 metric, which specifies the significance of the 
differences.  
The Kruskal-Wallis H test is performed by the following: 
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where ni is the number of observations in group i; rij is the rank of observa-
tion j from group i; N is the total number of observations across all of the 
groups. 
Based on this test, the calculated statistics are provided in Table 3.6. 
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Table 3.6. Assessment of the significance of the differences between the CVSS score 
and expert acquired data 
Var. df p χ2 Sig. bound. Conclusion 
SV; SVe 5 0.05 4.500 11.07 non-significant 
AC; ACe 4 0.05 6.523 9.49 non-significant 
CF; CFe 2 0.05 1.436 5.99 non-significant 
TI; TIe 4 0.05 5.000 9.49 non-significant 
VF; VFe 4 0.05 1.768 9.49 non-significant 
 
The comparison of the variables of Table 3.6 has concluded that there is 
no significant difference between the CVSS obtained scores and the expert 
evaluation. Based on the (NIST 2006) the significance boundaries (Sig. 
bound. of Table 3.6) are associated accordingly to the degrees of freedom 
(df). 
3.3. Implementation of Research Data to CySeMoL 
The Cyber Security Modeling Language (CySeMoL) is a sophisticated for-
malization for the assessment of cyber security on information system archi-
tectures. CySeMoL provides the ability of modeling in unified modeling lan-
guage (UML) along with Bayesian attack graph realization through the 
object constraint language (OCL).  
The output of the CySeMoL – a class diagram based heat-map specify-
ing the difficulty for an attacker to reach and compromise different assets 
within the architecture from a specific entry point or multiple points. Since 
the attacker can be attached to any node within the infrastructure, the scenar-
ios of attacks can be simulated according to the possible situations.  
The CySeMoL is based on knowledge acquired from domain experts and 
observation studies. CySeMoL incorporates various components of the archi-
tecture from both – software and hardware sides, including computing and 
networking hardware, operating systems, web-servers, firewalls, network 
interfaces and many more (Sommestad et al. 2013). 
The architecture here is represented as a graph where the nodes repre-
sent the components of the architecture with the edges representing their re-
lationships by having specific conditional relationships between the nodes. 
The CySeMoL is based on the P2AMF framework (Johnson et al. 2013) that 
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provides advanced probabilistic reasoning about architecture models in the 
form of UML class and object diagrams. It works under the Object Con-
straint Language (OCL), adding a probabilistic inference mechanism. 
The meta-class attributes in CySeMoL represent attack steps and coun-
termeasures to these attack steps. The attack steps are parts of attack scenari-
os, which are executed in order to reach the attack goals. Countermeasures 
are described as counter-actions to prevent from the attack goals to be 
achieved. While the existing CySeMoL attack goals have the attack trees de-
fined (Holm et al. 2013). 
The hypervisor meta-class attribute list along with extended explana-
tions is presented in Table 3.7. In this table an Identification number (ID) is 
given to every Attribute for future reference. The attributes are selected ac-
cording to the requirements (Req.) of subchapter 2.3, representing the attack 
steps and countermeasures Value source describes the way data for the at-
tribute value is acquired. LOC denotes that the value has to be specified 
manually and locally in the hypervisor class instance. INH denotes that the 
value of the attribute is inherited based on the Condition that requires a cer-
tain component to be present in the infrastructure. Default Value specifies 
whether the attribute is present (1) or absent (0) in the default state of the 
analysis. 
The links between the variables and the proposed CySeMoL Hypervisor 
meta-class attributes are presented in Fig. 3.7. 
Virtual Machine is an emulation of a physical computer system. From 
the software point of view the difference between the two types of machines 
is not visible. A VM performs the same tasks and procedures as a physical 
one, yet the only difference is that is not attached to a particular hardware 
setup, rather the resources are managed through the specific underlying layer 
of Hypervisor. Therefore, the only difference between the two is the Hyper-
visor being in between the OS and the hardware. 
Since Virtual Machine is treated as a physical machine from the proce-
dural side, to preserve the universal nature of the EA concepts, the Virtual 
Machine meta-class is rather expressed using the existing concepts of 
CySeMoL. More specifically – OperatingSystem and SoftwareProduct repre-
sent the Virtual Machine, on which the architecture of the machine can be 
built. 
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Table 3.7. Meta-class attributes and their values for the proposed CySeMoL 
hypervisor model 
ID Attribute Req. Value Source Condition 
Default 
Value 
Countermeasures 
Policies and Standards  
C1.1 ProductSupported 
REQ-1 LOC 
– 1 
C1.2 SecurityPolicyActive – 1 
Configuration Hardening  
C2.1 VNTrafficIsolated 
REQ-2 LOC 
– 1 
C2.2 MACChangeRejected – 1 
C2.3 RootOverSSHOff – 1 
C2.4 HypervisorPatched – 1 
Provisioning  
C3.1 FirewallOn 
REQ-3 INH 
IF Firewall exists – 
1, ELSE – 0 – 
C3.2 IntrusionDetectionOn IF IDSSensors exist – 1, ELSE – 0 – 
C3.3 AntiMalwareOn   
Attack Steps 
A01 ExploitFloodAttack 
– 
INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A02 ExploitAmplificationAt-tack INH 
IF IDSSensors 
exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A03 ExploitProtocol INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A04 ExploitMalformedPacket INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A05 ForgeMACAddress INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A06 AbuseMemoryAddress INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A07 AbuseStackHardening INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A08 AbusePoisonedCookies INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
A09 ExploitSharedNetwork INH IF IDSSensors exist – 0, ELSE – 1 1 
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Vulnerability variables
Product 
supported
Security policy 
active
VN traffic isolated
MAC change 
rejected
Root over SSH off
Hypervisor 
patched
Intrusion 
Detection on
Anti-malware on
Firewall on
Software 
vulnerability
Access 
vulnerability
Configuration 
vulnerability
Traffic isolation 
vulnerability
Virtual firewall 
vulnerability
 
Fig. 3.7. Links between the analyzed risk assessment variables  
and Hypervisor meta-class attributes (source: author) 
3.4. Improvements of the experimental setup 
During this study, areas for additional improvement have been noticed. Such 
improvements would allow implementing the proposed method and its’ practical 
usage easier and more fluent to current workflow of an organization. Such 
improvement, therefore, have been carried out and proposed in this thesis as 
well. 
3.4.1. Model transformation solution for improvement  
of the accessibility 
The process of this study has revealed the benefits of the Enterprise Architecture 
Modeling and the CySeMoL realization that is specifically designed to evaluate 
the information security risk. However, when it comes to using the CySeMoL 
for the information security related needs of a small or medium enterprise, the 
problem of accessibility arises. 
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While most of the sophisticated small and medium enterprises have their 
ICT infrastructure including the hardware and the software side well document-
ed, the specific knowledge, required to represent the same layout in the form of 
CySeMoL model requires either additional training or assistance from the side. 
However, it was presumed, that most of the data, required to generate a CySeM-
oL model can be acquired from the attributes of network and service level dia-
grams of looser form. The presumption lead to an additional research and a new-
ly proposed method for model transformation, as well as a tool, providing this 
functionality.  
This method provides a model transformation from an OPC/XML format 
stored diagram to the CySeMoL model. OPC is a container file, storing a com-
bination of files within organized into directories. This standardized format (ISO 
29500-2: 2012) is a well-documented solution enabling easy implementation and 
versatility of usage fields. A format, based on OPC for storing graphical notation 
has an extension of .vsdx. The structure of this file is a hierarchy of separate 
files and directories, placed in a container to ensure that extracting the required 
information is a well-structured process. 
The main tags of XML used in OPC/XML files include: 
• Shapes – describes a shape array; 
• Shape – describes a shape and its’ identification number, name, 
type and master template; 
• Cell – it is a versatile tag, containing information about name and 
value of many properties of cells under Shape and Section tags; 
• Text – gives text output, most commonly an object of instance, vis-
ible graphically; 
• Section – contains attribute information under it; 
• Row – stores attribute information; 
• Connects – describes array of connections; 
• Connect – defines a connector between instances, specifying sheets, 
cells and parts connected. 
The proposed approach is based on text analysis, structure comparison 
and relationship identification as presented in Fig. 3.8. It uses CySeMoL 
concept database to describe all possible components, its’ attributes, values 
and relationships between concepts. While there is no specific metamodel of 
OPC/XML drawing file, only abstract elements described by textual data and 
connections between these elements exist. Structure of such metamodel does 
not allow direct transformation, as static relationships between two meta-
models cannot be used.  
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE VIRTUALIZATION RISK ANALYSIS TO CYSEMOL 69 
 
 
Fig. 3.8. Basic principle of the source model transformation 
 to the target CySeMoL model  (source: author) 
The parsing of the source model extracts specific data, related to model vis-
ual presentation. The rest information, irrelevant for the transformation, can be 
disregarded. Therefore the extracted data only contains information about ob-
jects and relationships between them, disregarding the layout, theme and other 
supplemental information. Moreover, additional information describing an ob-
ject is gathered by extracting meta-information including shape name, descrip-
tion and defined attributes and their values. This data is obtained from .vsdx file 
package pages. All additional attributes can be obtained from .vsdx file package 
masters. While the parsing does not require deep analysis, transformation of ex-
tracted data is more complex. OPC/XML drawing file often is more abstract 
comparing to CySeMoL model and additional information has to be appended 
automatically. 
To make links between source and target models this approach proposes 
usage of CySeMoL concept dictionary with supplemented multiple synonyms 
for each concept. The dictionary for source model analysis includes all elements, 
specified as text based descriptions. This is very content dependent specification 
of elements with a lot of ambiguity, therefore a list of synonyms is used for each 
CySeMoL element to make sure that similar elements from source model are 
identified correctly. Additional context analysis is performed to define links be-
tween different level target model elements. This is done by using synonyms for 
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source model shape attributes (name and value). If the source model is well de-
scribed by choosing appropriate diagrams and defining associated property val-
ues, the data can be used to detail each shape and its content.  
To make the transformation even more detailed, example CySeMoL objects 
can be stored as templates. This enables creation of detailed CySeMoL objects 
rather than empty objects, requiring additional specification later. According to 
this data 3 possible results might occur in this transformation phase: 
• Fully described CySeMoL object – appropriate CySeMoL object ex-
ample is stored in the knowledge database and the name of the exam-
ple has synonyms in source model or enough property values of the 
example object matches source model property values. The margins of 
matching property can be configured to get different transformation 
precision. 
• Partially described CySeMoL object – appropriate CySeMoL object 
example is not stored in the knowledge database but some CySeMoL 
attribute values are matched to source model attribute values. 
• Empty CySeMoL object – relevant CySeMoL object example is not 
stored in the knowledge database and no attribute values of source 
model match CySeMoL attribute values. 
A specific software tool, based on this method has been developed and 
tested. The results of the performance of the tool are presented in Table 3.8. 
Table 3.8. Summary of transformation accuracy between the OPC/XML and CySeMoL,% 
Property 
SMEs network Web server 
Total 
Compo-
nents and 
links 
only 
Com-
ponent 
name 
added 
Component 
properties 
added 
Compo-
nents and 
links only 
Compo-
nent name 
added 
Compo-
nent 
properties 
added 
Correctly 
identified 
element 
percent-
age 
95 100 100 96 100 100 98 
Fully de-
scribed  87 93 97 73 93 92 88 
Partially 
described  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Empty  8 7 3 22 7 8 10 
Correctly 
identified 
object 
chain per-
centage 
81 98 100 64 98 97 87 
Total 88 99 100 79 99 98 94 
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Text, dictionary based analysis is used for element identification, however 
further reasoning is required for definition of the element from source model 
relation to destination metamodel. The combination of dictionary association, 
structure comparison and relationship similarities showed a 94% accuracy in this 
model transformation. This requires a detailed list of attributes in order to in-
crease the model transformation accuracy leading to a detailed situation descrip-
tion, useful for model transformation as well as EA formalization. 
The proposed method simplifies SMEs cybersecurity assessment analysis 
and allows existing resource usage for acquiring new models as well as provid-
ing additional knowledge. Though the method was tested in security area for 
CySeMoL model design, the approach does not limit its’ applicability, therefore 
it can be adjusted for a broader range of model transformations. 
3.4.2. The Service Level Agreement Meta-Class 
One of the main and most beneficial usage of virtualization technologies is the 
Cloud Computing service of many varieties. If the Cloud service is local, the 
regulatory basis of the service provider matches the one of the customer, as both 
belong to the same entity. However, when using Public Cloud services, the 
regulatory basis of the service provider may not only differ due to the 
organizational differences, but due to geographical, political and technical 
factors as well. The leveraging of these factors is a crucial factor when assessing 
the information security risk, thus it should be taken into account. However, the 
CySeMoL does not have such functionality implemented.  
Implementing the Service Level Agreement class allows (but not obliges) 
disregarding the security measures of the service provider when designing the 
layout. This means that the SLA class overrides the service provider security 
measures by ensuring, that these measures are described and agreed upon in the 
contract, as presented in Fig. 3.9. 
Cloud
SLA
 
Fig. 3.9. Graphical representation of the newly proposed meta-concept of SLA 
 and its’ relation to the model (source: author) 
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Based on this new concept, the customer is not required to know the 
technical realization of the security measures of software provider, rather relying 
on the measures defined in the contract. 
3.5. Conclusions of the Third Chapter 
During the experimental phase of the research the following conclusions have 
been reached: 
1. It was determined that the CVE database entry based score, used as a metric 
of the risk of exploiting the vulnerabilities is: SV=65.60% (±14.37), 
AC=82.00% (±11.00), CF=66.00% (±13.16), TI=71.00% (±9.89), 
VF=85.00% (±8.78).  
2. It was determined that the expert evaluation score, used as a metric of the 
risk of exploiting the vulnerabilities is: SVe= 59.81% (±4.02), ACe=70.42% 
(±3.70), CFe=65.00% (±2.91), TIe=65.42% (±3.46), VFe=60.90% (±9.40).  
3. Statistical analysis of expert evaluation using the classical Cooke’s method 
has revealed that 7 of the 31 expert respondents showed significant 
knowledge in the field, therefore taken into account. 
4. The comparison of the variables acquired from CVE and from expert 
knowledge has concluded that there is no significant difference between 
the two scores, with significance parameter χ2 in the range of 
[1.436; 6.523].
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General Conclusions 
1. The overview of existing literature has revealed the need for a 
thorough security threat categorization for virtualized systems. 
Although many approaches exist, they do not provide a consistent 
landscape for security analysis reference. The analyzed sources al-
low for a taxonomical categorization to be developed that is re-
quired for the newly developed Cyber Security Modeling Lan-
guage Hypervisor class. 
2. The proposed generalized security threat categorization taxonomy 
for virtualized systems consists of 34 threats within 8 categories. It 
can serve as the basis for the categorization of control means. 
3. The security of a virtualized system depends on the five parameters 
describing the overall health of the system: software vulnerabilities, 
access control, secure configuration, traffic isolation and virtual fire-
walls. 
4. Statistical values of the parameters are defined based on the exploita-
bility subscore of the CVSS scoring database. 
5. Statistical values of the parameters are validated using the results of 
expert evaluation. 
6. Implementation of the method to automated risk analysis solutions re-
quires for the situation, including the software and hardware architec-
74 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
ture and configuration, to be described in a strictly described model. 
To improve the accessibility to the proposed method, a model trans-
formation method has been developed. 
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Summary in Lithuanian 
Įvadas 
Problemos formulavimas 
Informacijos apsauga yra vienas svarbiausių šiuolaikinės organizacijos iššūkių. Nuolat 
augantis informacinių technologijų (IT) naudojimas šiuo metu aprėpia veiklas tiek orga-
nizacijos viduje, tiek išorėje. Dėl to informacijos apsauga yra itin aktuali užtikrinant 
sklandų procesų vykdymą. Dėl pastaruosius kelis dešimtmečius augančio IT naudojimo 
juntamas tyrimų, susijusių su šia tema, suaktyvėjimas. Juose gilinamasi kaip gali būti 
užtikrinama reikiamo lygio informacijos apsauga. Norint supaprastinti informacijos ap-
saugos užtikrinimo procesą taip pat yra kuriami automatizuoti įrankiai, diegiantys šių 
tyrimų rezultatus praktiškai. Šiame darbe terminai apsauga ir sauga laikomi tapačiais. 
Informacijos apsaugos apibrėžimas reikalauja turimos infrastruktūros, grėsmių ir 
pažeidžiamumų išmanymo. Taip pat reikalingas ir rizikos dydžiui įvertinti skirtas meto-
das, aprėpiantis bendrą informacijos apsaugos situaciją. Remiantis šiais duomenimis 
sudaromas rizikos valdymo planas. Informacijos apsaugai įtakos turintys veiksniai, nag-
rinėjami šioje disertacijoje apima IT infrastruktūros komponentus ir ryšius tarp jų. 
Informacijos apsaugos situacijos nustatymui įprasta atlikti rizikos analizę visai ar 
daliai turimos infrastruktūros. Infrastruktūros atvaizdavimo formalizavimui pasitelkia-
mas verslo architektūros (angl. Enterprise Architecture) modelis. Šis modelis leidžia 
formaliai aprašyti turimą aparatinę, programinę įrangą, teisinius įsipareigojimus bei vers-
lo procesus. Taip užtikrinamas įvairiapusis organizacijos IT veiklos aprašymas. 
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Virtualizacija yra palyginti nauja paradigma, sukėlusi revoliuciją IT infrastruktūros 
architektūros srityje. Aparatinė įranga tapo nebūtina procesams įgyvendinti. Taip pat 
virtualizacija suteikia galimybę patogiau iškelti savo procesus į trečiųjų šalių teikiamas 
paslaugas, taip sumažinant kaštus IT eksploatacijai ir įsigijimui. 
Virtualizuotų sistemų rizikos analizė yra labai svarbi šiuolaikinės IT informacijos 
apsaugos sritis. Ji padeda sudaryti tinkamą IT infrastruktūros architektūrą, sumažinant su 
informacijos apsauga susijusias rizikas. Tačiau dėl šios srities naujumo trūksta metodų ir 
jų taikymo pavyzdžių informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizei atlikti. Informacijos apsau-
gos automatizacijai pritaikytas metodas virtualizuotoms sistemoms vertinti yra pagrindi-
nis komponentas užtikrinantis informacijos apsaugą šioje srityje. Toks metodas užtikrin-
tų nešališką situacijos įvertinimą realiu laiku, nedelsiant vertinant pokyčius. 
Darbo aktualumas 
Virtualizacijos technologijos naudojamos beveik visose organizacijose ir jų naudojimas 
nuolatos auga. Tipiškiausi tokio naudojimo pavyzdžiai yra debesų kompiuterijos paslau-
gos – elektroninis paštas, dalinimosi bylomis paslauga ir kt. Dėl to kylančių rizikų ir 
grėsmių suvokimas yra labai svarbus užtikrinant organizacijos su IT susijusių veiklų 
sklandą. 
Norint pilnai suprasti su virtualizacija susijusias rizikas reikalingas metodas, geban-
tis vertinti šias rizikas organizacijos infrastruktūros ir procesų kontekste. Tai galima at-
likti analizuojant formaliai aprašytą modelį. Infrastruktūros architektūros modeliavimas, 
įskaitant verslo procesus bei aparatinę ir programinę įrangą gali būti atliekamas formali-
zuojant verslo architektūrą. Visgi specialių virtualizuotų sistemų konceptų trūkumas 
griežtai apibrėžtuose verslo architektūros modeliuose apsunkina jų naudojimą šioms 
sistemoms. Virtualizacija ir jos išteklių dalinimo savybė kuria naujus grėsmių vektorius, 
kurių tradicinė kompiuterija neturi. Šių vektorių apibrėžimas taip pat yra virtualizacijos 
informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės dalis. Dėl galimų architektūrinių sprendimų sudė-
tingumo bei verslo architektūros sistemų tikimybinės išvesties reikalinga, kad šiais vek-
toriais apibrėžtos rizikos būtų išreiškiamos kiekybiškai, t. y. turėtų skaitines pažeidžia-
mumų išnaudojimo reikšmes. 
Informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės procesas yra nuodugniai aprašytas moksli-
niuose darbuose, tačiau jaučiamas šių darbų, skirtų virtualizacijos technologijoms, trū-
kumas. Todėl trūksta informacijos kaip tiksliai įvertinti naujas, su virtualizacijos taiky-
mu susijusias grėsmes ir jų rizikas, susijusias su hipervizoriaus ir virtualios tinklo 
infrastruktūros apsauga (Catteddu, Hogben 2009). 
Taip pat pastebėtina, kad metodų, skirtų naudoti informacijos apsaugos automati-
zavimui virtualizuotoms sistemoms vertinti šiuo metu nėra. 
Šioje disertacijoje siekiama sukurti kiekybinį informacijos apsaugos rizikos anali-
zės vertinimo metodą virtualizuotoms sistemoms, pritaikytą naudoti automatizuotuose 
verslo architektūros analizės įrankiuose.  
Tyrimų objektas 
Darbo tyrimų objektas – virtualizuotų sistemų informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizė. 
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Darbo tikslas 
Disertacijos tikslas – pasiūlyti virtualizuotų sistemų informacijos apsaugos rizikos anali-
zės metodą. 
Darbo uždaviniai 
Darbo tikslui pasiekti ir mokslinei problemai spręsti darbe iškelti šie uždaviniai: 
1. Atlikti esamų informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės metodų, skirtų virtuali-
zuotoms sistemoms, analizę. 
2. Sudaryti su virtualizacija susijusių grėsmių aprašą, apibrėžiantį jų aprėptį. 
3. Sukurti kiekybinį rizikos analizės metodą, pritaikant informacijos apsaugos 
duomenų bazių informaciją, siekiant pakeisti ir / ar pagrįsti ekspertinio verti-
nimo rezultatus. 
4. Atlikti gautųjų įverčių lyginamąją statistinę analizę, įvertinant gautų rezultatų 
tikslumą ir nustatyti neapibrėžties dydį. 
5. Įvertinti pasiūlyto metodo patobulinimus verslo architektūros analizės sis-
temoje. 
Tyrimų metodika 
Darbe taikomi lyginamosios analizės ir literatūros analizės metodai, naudoti siekiant 
išanalizuoti tyrimo objektą. Informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės metodai taikomi sie-
kiant sukurti virtualizacijos technologijų grėsmių identifikavimo ir įverčių suteikimo 
sistemą. Eksperimentinių tyrimų metodai naudojami pagrįsti gautų rezultatų tikslumui. 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas 
Darbo mokslinis naujumas pagrįstas šiais rezultatais: 
1. Sukurtas naujas virtualizacijos informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės metodas, 
leidžiantis įvertinti hipervizoriui kylančias grėsmes ir jų įvykimo tikimybes. 
2. Informacija apie virtualiztuotų sistemų informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizę ir 
jos sudedamąsias dalis yra labai ribota. Šiai problemai spręsti siūlomas meto-
das, apibrėžiantis dalykinę sritį, grėsmių susiejimą su kontrolės priemonėmis, 
saugaus virtualizacijos komponentų naudojimo reikalavimus, atakų scenarijus 
ir kintamuosius, turinčius įtakos šių komponentų saugumui. 
3. Pasiūlytas ir ištirtas naujas kiekybinis duomenų apdorojimo metodas, naudo-
jantis aktualias išnaudojamumo įverčių reikšmes kintamųjų tikimybinėms 
reikšmėms aprašyti. 
4. Pasiūlytas naujas įverčių tikslumo įvertinimo metodas, naudojantis pritaikytas 
statistines procedūras ekspertų išrankai. Šios procedūros rezultatai suteikia ka-
libravimo ir entropijos įverčius informacijai su neapibrėžtimi. 
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Darbo rezultatų praktinė reikšme 
Darbe sukurto metodo praktinis įgyvendinimas leidžia analizuoti organizacijos infrast-
ruktūros informacijos apsaugos riziką, esant virtualizuotoms sistemoms. Šio metodo 
taikymas verslo architektūros analizės įrankio (angl. Enterprise Architecture Analysis 
Tool) aplinkoje užtikrina rizikos analizės automatizavimą, pokyčių vertinimo efektyvu-
mą bei architektūros apsaugos užtikrinimą projektavimo etape. 
Ginamieji teiginiai 
1. Siūlomas metodas leidžia informacijos apsaugos rizikos tikimybes įvertinti 
naudojant apdorotus pažeidžiamumo išnaudojamumo įverčius, gautus iš Ben-
drųjų pažeidžiamumų ir išnaudojamumų duomenų bazės. 
2. Siūlomas metodas gali būti naudojamas ekspertinės informacijos apie virtuali-
zuotų sistemų informacijos apsaugos riziką papildymui. 
Darbo rezultatų aprobavimas 
Disertacijos tema yra paskelbti keturi moksliniai straipsniai. Du iš jų yra publikuoti re-
cenzuojamuose mokslo žurnaluose, kurie yra įtraukti į Thomson Reuters ISI Web of 
Science duomenų bazę ir turi citavimo indeksą.  
Disertacijos rezultatai buvo aprobuoti 3 tarptautinėse konferencijose: 
− 12th IMEKO TC10 Workshop on Technical Diagnostics: New Perspectives in 
Measurements, Tools and Techniques for Industrial Applications. June 6–7, 
2013, Florence, Italy. 
− The 2014 International Conference on Information and Network Security 
(ICINS 2014). April 11–12, 2014, Jeju, South Korea. 
− The XXI IMEKO World Congress. August 29–September 5, Prague, Czech 
Republic. 
Disertacijos struktūra 
Disertaciją sudaro įvadas, trys pagrindiniai skyriai, bendrosios išvados, literatūros šalti-
nių sąrašas, autoriaus publikacijų disertacijos tema sąrašas, santrauka lietuvių kalba. 
Darbo apimtis – 112 puslapių neskaitant priedų, tekste yra 20 paveikslų ir 18 lentelių. 
Rašant disertaciją buvo panaudota 127 literatūros šaltiniai. 
1. Informacijos apsaugos užtikrinimo virtualizuotoms  
sistemoms metodai 
Skyriuje apžvelgiami esami informacijos apsaugos virtualizuotoms sistemoms tyrimai 
bei gilinamasi į teorinius virtualizacijos aspektus. Taip pat šiame skyriuje apibrėžiama 
informacijos apsaugos rizikos analizės sąvoka bei jos komponentai. 
Pastaruoju metu stebimas spartus informacinių technologijų (IT) taikymo augi-
mas įvairiose organizacijų veiklos srityse. Viena sparčiausiai populiarėjančių IT tai-
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kymo formų – virtualizacija – yra ne tik finansiškai efektyvus sprendimas, bet, su są-
lyga, kad įgyvendinta tinkamai, efektyvus ir apsaugos požiūriu. Svarbu paminėti, kad 
virtualizacijos apsaugos sritis yra platesnė už tradicinės kompiuterijos. Papildomi ap-
saugos aspektai šiuo atveju yra susiję su fizinių išteklių dalijimosi problema. Kadangi 
virtualizacijos apsauga pradėta domėtis palyginti neseniai – metodai apsaugos užtikri-
nimui šiuo metu tik vystomi. 
Virtualizacija ir su ja susijusi debesų kompiuterijos paslauga – itin patogus IT re-
sursų dalijimosi būdas, leidžiantis turėti tiek resursų, kiek yra reikalinga. Debesų kom-
piuterija pasižymi savitarnos galimybėmis, plačia tinklo aprėptimi, resursų apjungimu, 
elastingumu bei apmokėjimu tik už suteiktas pamatuotas paslaugas. Debesų kompiuteri-
jos paslaugos, priklausomai nuo kontrolės lygmens, suteikiamo paslaugos gavėjui, skai-
domos į: programinė įranga kaip paslauga; platforma kaip paslauga; bei infrastruktūra 
kaip paslauga. Pagal įdiegimo modelius debesų kompiuterija gali būti: privati; vieša; 
hibridinė; bendruomeninė. 
Dėl virtualizacijos taikymo kyla papildomos informacijos apsaugos grėsmės, susi-
jusios su papildomo hipervizoriaus komponento atsiradimu, tinklų virtualizacija ir atsie-
jimu nuo konkrečių fizinių įrenginių. Virtualiųjų tinklų ir jais perduodamų duomenų 
srautų apsauga yra sudėtingesnė nei fizinių tinklų. Konkrečių fizinių įrenginių svarbos 
sumažėjimas dėl orientavimosi į bendrą išteklių sąvadą sudėtingiau užtikrina šių resursų 
geografinį išsidėstymą. Visgi, virtualiųjų infrastruktūros komponentų naudojimas taip 
pat palengvina pasiekiamumo užtikrinimą, dėl galimybės nesudėtingai dubliuoti įrengi-
nius ir srautus. 
Informacijos apsaugą suvokiame kaip trijų kriterijų užtikrinimą. Šie kriterijai yra 
konfidencialumas, vientisumas ir prieinamumas (Kissel 2013). Rizikos analizė taip pat 
atliekama vertinant išteklių svarbą šiems kriterijams atitikti. Rizikos analizę apibrėžiame 
kaip procesą, skirtą įvertinti žalingų scenarijų įvykimą, jų dažnį bei poveikį. Rizikos 
analizė gali būti supaprastinta, standartinė arba grindžiama modeliavimu. Priklausomai 
nuo šios kategorijos skiriasi rizikos analizės išvesties rezultatas. Supaprastinta rizikos 
analizė neturi formalizuoto pavidalo ir atliekama kokybiniu principu. Standartinė rizikos 
analizė naudoja formalizuotą struktūrą, o jos rezultatas yra rizikų matricos. Modeliavimu 
grindžiamos analizės rezultatas pateikia sprendinių medį, todėl galimas įvertinimo atse-
kamumas. Rizikos analizės kokybei apibrėžti taikomi šie kriterijai (Haimes 2004): 
• Aprėpiamumas – rizikos analizės metu tiriamų veiksnių aprėptis turi užtik-
rinti, kad įvertinami visi galimi poveikį turintys veiksniai; 
• Įrodomumas – kiekvienas vertinamas veiksnys turi būti pagrįstas įrody-
mais; 
• Logiškumas – turi būti atsižvelgiama (net jei įrodymai tam prieštarauja) į 
galimas logines pasekmes; 
• Praktiškumas – rizikos analizės rezultatas turi būti praktiškai pritaikomas 
diegiant priemonių, skirtų rizikos mažinimui, planą; 
• Atsekamumas – visi rizikos analizės procesai turi būti dokumentuojami, 
pagrįsti ir lengvai atsekami; 
• Pagrįstumas – tik gerai pagrįsti kriterijai turi būti vertinami; 
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• Suderinamumas – rizikos analizė turi būti suderinama su galiojančiais po-
tvarkiais, standartais ar teisės aktais; 
• Mokymasis – rizikos analizė turi sudaryti pagrindą tobulėjimui ir žalingų 
veiksnių šalinimui; 
• Formalumas – rizikos analizė turėtų laikytis protokolo, kad būtų suderi-
nama su kitų rizikos analizių rezultatais; 
• Inovatyvumas – rizikos analizė turi prisitaikyti prie situacijos pokyčių ir 
vertinti naujai atsirandančias grėsmes. 
Disertacijoje apžvelgta šešiolika rizikos vertinimo metodų. Juos apibendrinus 
pastebėta, kad dauguma jų remiasi kokybiniu vertinimu, t. y. nepateikia skaitinių 
charakteristikų. 
Modeliavimu grindžiamai informacinių technologijų rizikos analizei reikalingas 
formalus modelis ir metodas, kuriuo remiantis būtų atliekama rizikos analizė. Infrastruk-
tūros ir procesų formalus modelis – verslo architektūra – tai modelis gebantis vaizduoti 
ir analizuoti objektus (komponentai, procesai) ir ryšius tarp jų. Architektūros modelia-
vimui naudojami specializuoti įrankiai leidžia ne tik atvaizduoti esamą situaciją, bet ir 
atlikti jos automatizuotą vertinimą. Atliktos lyginamosios šių modeliavimo aplinkų lygi-
namąją analizę nustatyta, kad plačiausias savybių rinkinys yra kibernetinio saugumo 
modeliavimo kalbos (CySeMoL) modelyje, kurio remiamasi tolimesniuose disertacijos 
skyriuose.  
Verslo architektūros modelyje jos komponentai aprašomi klasėmis, atributuose nu-
rodant jų parametrus. Vertinant duomenų apsaugos požiūriu, šie parametrai skirstomi į 
dvi grupes – atakos žingsnis (attack step) ir apsauga (defense). Pavyzdžiui operacinės 
sistemos klasė gali turėti tokius atakos žingsnius kaip patekimas, paslaugos sutrikdymas, 
kritinio pažeidžiamumo aptikimas, patekimas per vartotojo sąsają Apsaugos parametrai 
gali būti ugniasienės veikimas, saugos papildinių įdiegimas, apsauga nuo kenksmingo 
programinio kodo ir kt. 
2. Rizikos analizės modeliavimas ir taikymas virtualizacijos 
technologijoms 
Šiame skyriuje detaliai aprašomas tyrimo metodas, leidžiantis jungti skirtingus metodus 
tarpusavyje, siekiant išanalizuoti rizikas kylančias virtualizuotoms sistemoms.  
Šis metodas tarpusavyje apjungia įvairius metodus. Jis apima: 
1. Grėsmių aprėpties nustatymą. 
2. Grėsmių susiejimą su kontrolės priemonėmis. 
3. Atakų scenarijų apibrėžimą. 
4. Kintamųjų, apibrėžiančių rizikos dydį, nustatymą. 
5. Skaitinių reikšmių suteikimą kintamiesiems. 
6. Rezultatų korektiškumo įvertinimą. 
Taip pat šio metodo pritaikomumui automatizuotam modeliavimui papildomai atli-
kami šie veiksmai: kontrolės priemonės grupuojamos į apsaugos reikalavimų grupes 
siekiant sumažinti įvesties apimtį; atakų scenarijai išplečiami atakos-gynybos scenarijais 
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siekiant įvertinti kontrolės priemonių efektyvumą. Metodo procesų aprašomoji diagrama 
pateikiama S2.1 paveiksle.  
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S2.1 pav. Aukšto lygio metodo procesų diagrama (blokinė schema) 
Kaip matyti iš S2.1 paveikslo, šiame metode yra keturios įvestys ir viena išvestis. 
Išvestis yra rizikų tikimybių reikšmės. Kiekybinė charakteristika šiuo atveju yra reika-
linga detaliam rizikos vertinimui verslo architektūros analizės aplinkoje. 
Dalykinės srities apibrėžimui reikalinga sudaryti grėsmių, kylančių virtualizuotoms 
sistemoms, sąrašą ir jų sąsajas su atskiromis kategorijomis. Esamų kategorizavimo 
sprendimų analizė parodė, kad jie nėra pakankami, todėl buvo sudaryta nauja virtuali-
zuotoms sistemoms kylančių grėsmių taksonomija, apimanti techninius, teisinius bei 
komercinius virtualizacijos įgyvendinimo aspektus. Įvertinus kokybinius šios taksonomi-
jos aspektus gauta išvada, kad taksonomija sudaryta kokybiškai. 
Gautos grėsmės susietos su kontrolės priemonių matricoje pateikiamomis kontrolės 
priemonėmis. Šios kontrolės priemonės sugrupuotos į reikalavimus saugiam virtualizaci-
jos įgyvendinimui. Sudaryti trys pagrindiniai reikalavimai: Įdiegtos informacijos apsau-
gos valdymo politikos, suderinamos su standartais; naudojamas žinomas ir patikrintas 
hipervizorius; naudojamos tinkamos apsaugos priemonės. 
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Remiantis kitų autorių tyrimų duomenimis suformuotas penkių pagrindinių kinta-
mųjų, turinčių įtakos rizikos dydžiui, sąrašas. Jis pateikiamas S 2.1 lentelėje. 
S 2.1 lentelė. Kintamieji hipervizoriaus rizikos analizei 
Kintamasis Aprašas 
SV 
Programinės įrangos pažeidžiamumas, leidžiantis „peršokti“ iš vienos 
virtualiosios mašinos į kitą. 
AC 
Prieigos pažeidžiamumas, leidžiantis neteisėtai gauti administratoriaus 
privilegijų prieigą. 
CF Saugios konfigūracijos pažeidžiamumas, apimantis visą riziką bendrai. 
TI Srautų izoliacijos nebuvimas, leidžiantis informacijos nutekėjimą. 
VF 
Virtualių ugniasienių nebuvimas, neužtikrinantis apsaugos virtualizuotos 
aplinkos viduje. 
Skaitinėms kintamųjų reikšmėms gauti pasirinkti duomenys iš JAV nacionalinės 
pažeidžiamumų duomenų bazės, kadangi jie turi plačiausią aprėptį ir didžiausią 
patikimumą. Duomenų korektiškumui patikrinti sudaryta srities ekspertų imtis, kurios 
atsakymais yra remiamasi šio tyrimo metu. 
Ekspertų kalibravimui pasitelktas ekspertinės informacijos išrankos metodas 
(Cooke 1991), reikalaujantis sudaryti dviejų tipų klausimus: klausimus su žinomais atsa-
kymais ekspertų kalibravimui; klausimus su nežinomais atsakymais ekspertiniam įverti-
nimui gauti. Disertacijos tyrimui sudaryti penki klausimai kalibravimui ir vienuolika 
klausimų kintamųjų įverčiams gauti. 
3. Virtualizuotų sistemų rizikos analizės taikymas  
CySeMoL aplinkoje 
Šiame skyriuje taikomi antrojo skyriaus tyrimuose gauti duomenys, siekiant įgyven-
dinti automatizuotą virtualizuotų sistemų rizikos analizės sistemą. Tam atlikti iš 
NVD duomenų bazės naudojami CVE tipo įrašai ir jų CVSS įverčiai. Konkrečiai 
naudojamas antrinis CVSS Išnaudojamumo įvertis. Kiekvienam kintamajam atrink-
tos naujausi su šio kintamojo grėsmėmis susiję CVE įrašai. Atlikus jų statistinę ana-
lizę nustatyti imčių aprašomieji parametrai. Remiantis šiais parametrais nustatyta, 
kad kintamųjų reikšmių pasiskirstymas neatitinka normaliojo skirstinio, todėl kinta-
miesiems aprašyti naudojamas centriškai orientuotas matavimo būdas – vindsorizuo-
tas vidurkis, pašalinant 10% ribinių reikšmių (Fuller 1991). Kintamųjų reikšmės 
pateikiamos S3.1 lentelėje. Svarbu paminėti, kad šie rezultatai pateikiami dešimtba-
lėje sistemoje, o tikimybinis vertinimas atliekamas dešimtabalėje sistemoje, todėl 
įverčiai bus dauginami iš dešimties. 
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S3.1 lentelė. Kintamųjų įverčiai (CVSS) 
Kintamasis SV AC CF TI VF 
Viršutinė riba 8,047 9,300 8,081 8,209 9,518 
Įvertis 6,560 8,200 6,600 7,100 8,500 
Apatinė riba 5,123 7,100 5,399 6,151 7,832 
Neapibrėžtis 1,437 1,100 1,316 0,989 0,878 
Ekspertų kalibravimo analizė parodė, kad iš 31 apklausto eksperto 7 ekspertų 
svorinis koeficientas yra didesnis už 0, todėl jų žinios įvertintos kaip pakankamos 
dalyvauti šiame tyrime. Priklausomai nuo atsakymų koreliavimo su žinomomis 
teisingomis reikšmėmis šių ekspertų svoriai suteikti skirtingai. Ekspertų gautų rezultatų 
kintamųjų reikšmės pateikiamos S 3.2 lentelėje. 
S3.2 lentelė. Kintamųjų įverčiai (ekspertinis vertinimas) 
Kintamasis SVe ACe CFe TIe VFe 
Viršutinė riba 63,83 74,12 67,91 68,88 65,6 
Įvertis 59,81 70,42 65,00 65,42 60,90 
Apatinė riba 55,78 66,71 62,09 6196 56,20 
Neapibrėžtis 4,02 3,70 2,91 3,46 9,40 
Atliekant lyginamąją analizę, pirmoji charakteristika – koreliacinė analizė 
(S3.1 pav.). Ji parodė, kad koreliacija tarp dydžių yra silpna (r = 0,0849). Tačiau iš 
grafiko matyti, kad nesutampa tik vieno kintamojo – VF reikšmė. Atmetus šio kintamojo 
reikšmes koreliacija yra stipri (r = 0,8964). 
 
S3.1 pav. Koreliacinė analizė tarp ekspertinio vertinimo ir duomenų bazių įverčių 
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Tolimesnei analizei naudojamas Kruskal-Wallis H testas. Tai yra neparametrinis 
testas naudojamas nustatyti statistiškai reikšmingus skirtumus tarp dviejų ar daugiau 
imčių, kuomet pasiskirstymas nėra normalus. Šio tyrimo rezultatai (S3.3 lentelė) parodė, 
kad skirtumai tarp šių imčių nėra reikšmingi, todėl galima teigti, kad galima keisti vieną 
duomenų šaltinį kitu.  
S3.3 lentelė. Skirtumo tarp dviejų šaltinių duomenų reikšmingumo tyrimas 
Kintamasis df p χ2 Reikšmingumo ribos Išvada 
SV; SVe 5 0,05 4,500 11,07 nereikšmingas 
AC; ACe 4 0,05 6,523 9,49 nereikšmingas 
CF; CFe 2 0,05 1,436 5,99 nereikšmingas 
TI; TIe 4 0,05 5,000 9,49 nereikšmingas 
VF; VFe 4 0,05 1,768 9,49 nereikšmingas 
Remiantis šiais duomenimis pasiūlyta nauja hipervizoriaus meta-klasė CySeMoL 
aplinkoje, vertinanti virtualizuotų sistemų grėsmes automatiniu būdu. 
Bendrosios išvados 
1. Literatūros analizė atskleidė išsamaus vieningo virtualiztuotų sistemų apsaugos 
grėsmių skirstymo į kategorijas poreikį. Egzistuojantys sprendimai neužtikrina 
vientiso grėsmių apibrėžimo, reikalingo apsaugos analizei atlikti. Išnagrinėti 
šaltiniai tinkami būti virtualizuotų sistemų apsaugos grėsmių taksonomijos pa-
grindu, naudojamu naujoje kibernetinės apsaugos modeliavimo kalbos hipervi-
zoriaus klasėje.  
2. Sudaryta apibendrinta virtualizuotų sistemų apsaugos grėsmių aprašymo takso-
nomija. Apibendrinus grėsmes, aprašytas CVE duomenų bazėje ir esamus 
mokslinius tyrimus nustatyta, kad šiuo metu egzistuoja 34 grėsmės. Nutatyta, 
kad jos patenka į 8 kategorijas. Ši taksonomija naudotina kaip kontrolės prie-
monių skirstymo į kategorijas pagrindas. 
3. Atlikus virtualizuotų sistemų apsaugai įtaką turinčių veiksnių tyrimą nustatyta, 
kad ji priklauso nuo penkių parametrų, aprašančių sistemos imunitetą: progra-
minės įrangos pažeidžiamumai, prieigos valdymas, apsaugos konfigūracija, 
srautų atskirtis ir virtualios ugniasienės. 
4. Nustatyta, kad statistiniai parametrų įverčiai gali būti sudaryti remiantis išnau-
dojamumo įverčiais, gautais iš CVE įverčių duomenų bazės. 
5. Atlikus parametrų statistinių įverčių pagrindimą naudojant ekspertinio ver-
tinimo rezultatus nustatyta, kad skirtumai tarp CVE įverčių duomenų bazės 
ir ekspertinio vertinimo nėra reikšmingi, todėl CVE įverčių duomenų bazės 
įverčius galima naudoti virtualizuotų sistemų informacijos apsaugos rizikos 
analizei. 
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6. Nustatyta, kad metodo praktiniam pritaikymui reikalingas esamos situaci-
jos, įskaitant programinės ir aparatinės įrangos architektūrą ir konfigūraci-
ją, aprašymas griežtai apibrėžto modelio pavidalu organizacijose yra sun-
kiai sudaromas. Siekiant pagerinti metodo pritaikomumą buvo sukurtas 
modelių transformacijos metodas skirtas šiai situacijai supaprastinti.
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